05000324/FIN-2009002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for a Plant Modification (Section 1R18) |
| Description | The inspectors identified a severity level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments for failing to perform a written safety evaluation prior to implementing a change to the facility as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), when the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor building instrument air standby compressors were permanently abandoned. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program and performed a written safety evaluation of the condition. The inspectors determined that, until identified by NRC inspectors, the licensee had not performed a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for the abandonment of the instrument air standby compressors, and this is a performance deficiency. Because this is a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, it is considered to be a violation which potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process. Therefore, such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. This finding was determined to be more than minor because their was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). This likelihood is based on the increased likelihood of loss of reactor building instrument air, reactor scram, and closure of the outboard MSIVs, which is an occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) that is analyzed in the UFSAR. To determine the significance of the violation, the inspectors completed a significance determination review using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At Power Situations. The finding impacted the initiating events cornerstone. Because the finding does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available, this finding has very low safety significance. The cause of the finding is not related to a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency is not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R18 |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2009002 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen G Kuzo R Chou R Musser G Kolcum K Ellis B Davis M Corsey R Jackson |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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