05000324/FIN-2009003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Plant Procedures During Performance of a Reactor Pressure Vessel Hydrostatic Test |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Administrative Control (Procedures), was identified when the licensee failed to follow plant procedure OPT-80.1, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) ASME Section XI Pressure Test during Unit 2 RPV hydrostatic testing on April 7, 2009. The licensee installed hoses rated for 250 psig although the procedure required hoses rated at 1150 psig. Specifically, when RPV pressure was raised to approximately 1000 psig, the improper hose installed at core spray check valve 2-E21-F006B disconnected from its coupling, causing the RPV to rapidly depressurize to approximately 875 psig and allowing water from the RPV to leak out of the connection into the drywell. The licensee discovered the leak and broken hose connection, isolated the leak, and initiated AR329675329675to address this issue. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of human performance and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors determined that the finding should be evaluated in accordance with Attachment 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations SDP. The inspectors used Checklist 8 contained in Attachment 1 and determined that the finding did require a phase 2 or phase 3 because the licensee did not meet the appropriate safety function guidelines for inventory control. Specifically, the finding increases the likelihood of a loss of RCS inventory. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) determined, after a teleconference with the headquarters SRA with responsibility for Shutdown findings, that the event did not rise to a level that would require a detailed analysis be performed. The event did not meet the threshold for a loss of control as defined by Appendix G. Additional margin was provided by the high elevation of the leak relative to the top of active fuel, and the suction head requirement of the residual heat removal (RHR) system, the small size of the opening in the primary, the low decay heat, and the defense in depth available at the time of the event. Based on this, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross cutting area, because the licensee failed to follow plant procedure 0PT-80.1, Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) ASME Section XI Pressure Test during Unit 2 RPV hydrostatic testing. (H.4(b)) |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2009003 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Chou R Carrion R Musser G Kolcum P Lessard |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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