05000324/FIN-2008005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Plant Procedures for Assembly of Safety Relief Valves |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to correctly reassemble the pilot valve for the Unit 2 Safety Relief Valve (SRV) H. The plant procedure for assembly of the pilot valve, 0CM-VSR-509, Main Steam Relief Valves Target Rock Model 7567 Air Operators and Pilot Assembly, Disassembly, Inspection, and Reassembly, used in 2006 for the Unit 2 SRV H pilot valve specifies that, during assembly, the pilot spring should be placed inside of the pilot valve spring follower. Contrary to this requirement, the pilot valve was assembled with the pilot spring on the ledge of the pilot valve spring follower. The incorrectly assembled pilot valve was installed in Unit 2 in March, 2007 on SRV H. On November 9, 2008, the spring slipped off the ledge of the spring follower, reducing the SRV set point pressure, and causing the SRV to lift at normal operating pressure. The licensee replaced the failed SRV and initiated a root cause analysis to determine the primary and contributing cause of this event. The failure to assemble the SRV pilot per procedure was identified as a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The finding has a crosscutting aspect of procedural compliance, as described in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to follow the procedure as written (H.4(b)). (Section 4OA3 |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
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| Report | IR 05000324/2008005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | H Gepford J Austin M Bates D Jones R Musser R Baldwin G Kolcum |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2008005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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