05000317/FIN-2011005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Did not adequately prescribe and implement procedures associated with protected equipment |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified, because Constellation did not prescribe and accomplish procedures appropriate to the circumstances associated with protected safety related equipment. As a result, on October 3, 2011, Constellation allowed work on a protected emergency diesel generator (EDG). The work activity inadvertently resulted in the protected EDG becoming inoperable. This led to required Technical Specification (TS) shutdowns of Unit 1 and Unit 2 because the other required EDG was already out of service (OOS) for planned maintenance. Prior to the shutdown being completed, the protected EDG was restored to an operable status and the shutdowns were aborted. Immediate corrective actions included entering this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), issuing a site wide communication stating the expectations regarding work on protected safety equipment, and revising the Operations Administrative Policy (OAP) associated with protected equipment. The 1nding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the work activity impacted the availability and capability of the \'1A EDG. The inspectors determined the finding is of very low safety significance because the performance deficiency was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not involve an actual loss of safety function for greater than its individual TS allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision making, because the Constellation did not adequately make a risk significant decision using a systematic process when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, Constellation personnel did not follow the integrated work management process for emergent work which ultimately led to the downpower of both units (H.1 .a per IMC 0310) |
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000317/2011005 Section 1R04 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.04 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Silk S Pindale G Dentel P Presby S Kennedy D Kern R Rolph J Hawkins E Torres K Cronk M Jennerich |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2011005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2011Q4
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