05000305/FIN-2012004-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Commercial Grade Dedication Leads to Premature Bearing Failure |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, because the licensee failed to adequately dedicate a commercial-grade item for use in a safety-related (SR) application. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly dedicate two motors for use in SR fan coil units (FCUs). The finding was entered into the licensees CAP as CR 487269. The licensee assigned an ACE to determine the organizational failures that led to the violation. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the design control attribute objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly dedicate a commercial-grade item, the FCU motor, caused the non-functionality of the TBFCU 1B and the inoperability of the train B AFW system. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions. The inspectors concluded that the TS equipment supported by TBFCU 1B, which consisted of buses 61, 62, and the train B AFW system, may have been inoperable for a time period greater than the respective TS action statements, and therefore answered Yes to Mitigating System Cornerstone Question 3, and determined that a detailed risk assessment was necessary. The inspectors worked with RIII senior reactor analysts (SRAs) and concluded that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the licensee had abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) in place to prop open doors upon a complete loss of safeguards alley room cooling and supporting calculations that concluded the affected equipment would perform for the 24-hour probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) mission time without the TBFCU. The inspectors concluded there was no cross-cutting aspect with this finding because the failure to properly dedicate the motors occurred in 2005, and was not representative of current performance. |
Site: | Kewaunee ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000305/2012004 Section 1R18 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Winter K Riemer J Jandovitz R Krsek V Meghani K Barclay A Shaikh V Myers |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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