05000305/FIN-2012004-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Risk Assessment During Heavy Lift Over Service Water System |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, paragraph (a)(4), for the failure to properly assess and manage risk when the licensee lifted a 44,000-pound motor over the portion of the service water (SW) screenhouse containing the train B SW header. Specifically, the licensee should not have credited train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) in the power availability portion of their shutdown safety assessment (SSA). The licensee entered this into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR491721. The licensee assigned an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) to determine the organizational failures. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The licensee did not maintain a shutdown probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) model, so an incremental core damage probability could not be estimated for the specific plant conditions. For this reason, the inspectors determined that IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, could not be used. The inspectors used IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, dated April 12, 2012, which directs inspectors to perform a bounding analysis. The inspectors conservatively assumed that EDG B was actually lost and used Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs [Pressurized-Water Reactors] and BWRs [Boiling-Water Reactors], dated May 25, 2004, to determine the risk. Specifically, the inspectors selected Checklist 4, PWR Refueling Operation, and found, for the power availability function, the licensee met the checklist objective to comply with TSs because only one EDG was required to be operable, and EDG A remained operable and protected. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, because the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to incorporate risk insights and plant SSCs into their evaluation. |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2012004 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Winter K Riemer J Jandovitz R Krsek V Meghani K Barclay A Shaikh V Myers |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||