05000298/LER-2016-010, Inadequate Compensatory Measures Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
| ML17054C825 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/2017 |
| From: | Higginbotham K Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NLS2017019 LER 16-010-00 | |
| Download: ML17054C825 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 2982016010R00 - NRC Website | |
text
H Nebraska Public Power District Always there when you need us NLS2017019 February 15, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report No. 2016-010-00 Cooper Nuclear Station, Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46
Dear Sir or Madam:
The purpose of this correspondence is to forward Licensee Event Report 2016-010-00.
There are no new commitments contained in this letter.
Sincerely, K6nboiliam Vice President Nuclear-Chief Nuclear Officer
/jo Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2016-010-00 cc:
Regional Administrator w/attachment USNRC - Region IV Cooper Project Manager w/attachment.
USNRC - NRR Plant Licensing Branch IV Senior Resident Inspector w/attachment USNRC-CNS SRAB Administrator w/attachment NPG Distribution w/attachment INPO Records Center w/attachment via ICES entry SORC Chairman w/attachment CNS Records w/attachment COOPER NUCLEAR STATION P.O. Box 98 /Brownville, NE 68321-0098 Telephone: (402) 825-3811 I Fax: (402) 825-5211 www.nppd.com
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BYOMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES:
(11-2015) 10/31/2018
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, the NRC may not conduct or soonsor, and a oerson is not reauired to resoond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1of4
- 4. TITLE Inadequate Compensatory Measures Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR ISEQUENTIALI REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET MONTH DAY YEAR NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NUMBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET 07 11 2016 2016-010 -
00 02 15 2017 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: Check all that apply) 0 20.2201(b}
0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 181 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 73.77(a)(1) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) 0 73.77(a)(2)(i) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 181 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in =
PLANT STATUS YEAR 2016 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 010 Cooper Nuclear Station was in Mode 1, Power Operations, at 100 percent power, at the time of the event.
BACKGROUND REV NO.
- - 00 The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to *cool the core. during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Cooling Injection (HPCI) System [EllS:BJ], the Core Spray (CS) System [EllS:BM], the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCl):mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System [EllS:BO], and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS).
The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. The emergency condensate storage tanks (ECSTs) are capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI system.
ECCS components located in the four Reactor Building [EllS:NG] quads are subject to flooding from line breaks such as the steam tunnel feedwater line break. The Technical Specifications (TS) related equipment contained in these quads are: Division 1 CS and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [EllS:BN] in the Northeast quad; Division 1 RHR in the Northwest quad; Division 2 CS in the Southeast quad, and Division 2 RHR and HPCI in the Southwest quad. Division 2 CS is assumed and evaluated as.lost during the 18-inch feedwater flooding event, The Reactor Building floor drain and Torus drain valves [EllS:V] are designed to close on respective sump hi-hi level conditions to divert water to the Torus area. The Reactor Building floor drain and the Torus drain valve closure are barriers credited in the internal flooding analysis.
FP-TD-19-2 causes the following valves to fail closed:
RW-AOV-A0767, Torus Drain to Sump A RW-AOV-A0770, Reactor Building Drains to Sump A RW-AOV-A0768, Torus Drain to Sump B RW-AOV-A0771, Reactor Building Drains to Sump B RW-AOV-A0773, Reactor Building Drains to Sump C RW-AOV-A0772, Reactor Building Drains to Sump D
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On July 11, 2016, at 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br />, while performing fire detection systems examination per surveillance procedure, it was identified that detector FP-TD-19-2 would not reset, thus initiating alarm FP-1/C-4, Reactor Building Southeast Quad Zone 19. Per the alarm card, if no fire is detected, and the detectors cannot be reset, the Operator is to place the floor drain valve control switches to OPEN and periodically NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
- *. tt-
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,........... )\\_
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~
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i~) (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R 3 for instruction and guidance for completing this fonm http://www.nrc.gov/reading-nm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
Page 3 of 4 APPROVED BYOMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV Cooper Nuclear Station 05000-298 NUMBER NO.
2016
- - 010
- - 00 NARRATIVE monitor sump levels. As such, Operations placed the Torus area and Reactor Building floor drain valve control switches in the OPEN position and commenced hourly checks of the Reactor Building floor drain sump levels for unusual changes.
Detector FP-TD-19-2 was replaced, post work testing completed satisfactory, and the detector was declared unimpaired on July 15, 2016, at 14:32 hours. Additionally, the control switches for the applicable valves were placed to AUTO.
It was subsequently determined that by placing the drain valve control switches to OPEN, the automatic flood protection function that is credited in CNS' internal flooding analysis, was defeated.
During the time the detector was impaired, there were no compensatory actions taken to ensure Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR systems were protected from postulated flooding caused by a high::energy line break. As such, it was determined that both Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR were inoperable for a
- ,:i.
period greater than allowed by TS 3.5.1, Condition H.
- BASIS FOR REPORT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications, and also in accordance with 10~CFR
- 50. 73(a)(2)(ix)(A) as any event or condition that as a result of a single cause could have prever:ited the fulfillment of a safety function for two or more trains or channels that are needed to remove residual heat.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance of this event is low. The Division 1 CS and Division 1 RHR Systems were inoperable for approximately 4 days. In the case of postulated flooding caused by a main feedwater break, Division 2 RHR system and the ADS were available to mitigate the event. This event did not cause an impact to the safety of the general public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, or radiological safety.
CAUSE
The apparent cause was determined to be that when the flooding requirements in the Reactor Building changed, a review of alarm cards did not identify alarm card FP-1/C-4 as needing updated.
NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
NRC FORM 366 (11-2015)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
!¥~
'-:.....:.r (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)
(See NUREG-1022, R 3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
Page 4 of 4 APPROVED BYOMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2018 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed bock to industJy. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055!>-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER Cooper Nuclear Station 05000-298 NARRATIVE
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
YEAR 2016 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 010 Alarm card FP-1/C-4 was revised to remove taking radwaste valves out of AUTO for each quad. In addition, the applicable procedure has been revised to ensure actions taken will ensure operability is maintained for environmentally qualified components in each of the Reactor Building quads; and a review of fire panel alarm cards will be performed for similar occurrences where monitoring is the only action taken.
PREVIOUS EVENTS There have been no recent reportable events related to inadequate internal flooding protection',
compensatory measures.
NRC FORM 366 (06-2016)
REV NO.
- - 00