05000285/LER-2008-003, Regarding Operation with Inoperable EDG and Opposite Train Feature Prohibited by TS
| ML090280367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/2009 |
| From: | Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-09-0001 LER 08-003-00 | |
| Download: ML090280367 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2852008003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
ew51MM ma i P Omaha PublicPower District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 LIC-09-0001 January 12, 2009 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2008-003 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report. 2008-003, Revision,0,. dated.January,12,--
2009.
This. report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b).and:,
10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B). No commitments are made to the NRC in this letter.
If you should have any questions, please contact me.
/,Jeffrey A. Reinhart VSite Vice President Fort Calhoun Station JAR/epm Attachment c:
E. E. Collins, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV Alan Wang, NRC Project Manager J. D. Hanna, NRC Senior.Reside.etnspector INPO Records Center 4171 Employment with Equal Opportunity
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1
OF 4
- 4. TITLE Operation With Inoperable EDG and Opposite Train Feature Prohibited by TS
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTI REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR AL NO MONTH DAY YEAR05000 NUMBER FACILITY NAME 0}5000 03 21 2008 2008
- - 003-00 01 12 2009
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201 (b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 0
20.2201 (d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E
20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71 (a)(4) 0 0
20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
X 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71 (a)(5) 0l 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system is provided for storage, pumping and delivery of makeup water to the steam generators in order to remove decay heat if the Main Feedwater (MFW) system is not available. The AFW system consists of one emergency feedwater storage tank; one motor-driven (FW-6) and one turbine-driven (FW-10)
AFW pump; one non-safety-related, diesel-driven AFW pump (FW-54); one non-safety-related diesel fuel oil transfer pump and day tank; non-safety-related fuel oil piping and valves; remotely operated flow control valves; interconnecting piping to the MFW system and piping to the auxiliary feedwater nozzles in the steam generators.
FW-6 and FW-10 are the safety related AFW pumps. The AFW system provides a redundant means of supplying one or both Steam Generators (SGs) with feedwater. The emergency power source for FW-6 is Diesel Generator (DG) 1.
FW-54 is the startup auxiliary feedwater pump. FW-54 takes suction from the condensate storage tank and discharges to the normal feedwater header. FW-54 and its associated equipment are not safety related.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On March 21, 2008, FCS was operating in TS Mode 3, subcritical, at a nominal 530 degrees Fahrenheit.
On March 21, 2008, at 0102 Central Standard Time (CST), turbine driven AFW pump FW-10, was taken out of service and declared inoperable for maintenance. Entry was made into TS 2.5(1)B.
At 1427 on March 21, DG-1 was taken out of service and declared inoperable for the performance of a surveillance test. Entry was made into TS 2.7(2)j, a 7-day LCO. At 1445, DG-1 was subsequently declared OPERABLE. At 1723, FW-10 was declared OPERABLE.
With FW-10 inoperable and the emergency power source for the FW-6 inoperable, FW-6 was also inoperable for the 18 minutes that DG-1 was inoperable.
Entry into TS 2.5(1)D Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) was not made when both AFW trains were made inoperable.
The issue was confirmed on November 11, 2008, after reviewing appropriate documentation. This report is being submitted pursuant to IOCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(b) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B).
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P~IN I LU UN XLCYCLLD PAPER
CONCLUSION The root cause of this event is still being investigated. A supplement to this LER will be submitted when the cause determination is complete.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Following discovery of this event, interim guidance was provided to operations on application of TS. Additional actions will be administered by the corrective action system.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
For a short period of time, both of the emergency feedwater pumps were inoperable. One of the pumps (FW-10) was undergoing maintenance. The other pump (FW-6) should have been declared inoperable because its emergency power source (DG-1) was inoperable. The normal source of power to FW-6 was available throughout this event.
Feeding the SGs was needed for decay heat removal. At the time of this event, the reactor had been shutdown for a week. In this case, decay heat was about 0.3 percent of full reactor power. During the time of the event, non safety related diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-54) was feeding the SG. Should FW-54 have been lost, at least an hour would have been available before feedwater would be required to remove decay heat. The MFW system was available to feed the SGs during the time emergency feedwater was inoperable. Once-through-cooling with the high pressure safety injection system (HPSI) also could have been used if needed. During the time in question, the SG levels were in the normal operating range. Thus, a large volume of water was available to remove decay heat. The short duration of the event and the other available methods of decay heat removal result in this event having no significant impact on the health and safety of the public.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
LER 1996-006 documents a similar occurrence.
NRC 1-ORM 366A (9-2007)
PRIN I LU UN RECYCLLU PAPERPRINTED ON RECYULEO PAPER