05000285/LER-2006-002, Re Inadequate Design Control Results in Potentially Insufficient Auxiliary Feedwater Flow

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Re Inadequate Design Control Results in Potentially Insufficient Auxiliary Feedwater Flow
ML062560050
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 09/05/2006
From: Faulhaber H
Omaha Public Power District
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LIC-06-0095 LER 06-002-00
Download: ML062560050 (8)


LER-2006-002, Re Inadequate Design Control Results in Potentially Insufficient Auxiliary Feedwater Flow
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion: 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown

10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2852006002R00 - NRC Website

text

Omaha Public Power Distnct 444 South 16th Street Mfall Omnaha NE 68102-2247 September 5, 2006 LIC-06-0095 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P 1 -13 7 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Subject:

Docket No. 50-285 Licensee Event Report 2006-002 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2006-002, Revision 0, dated September 5, 2006. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B). This letter contains no commitments to the NRC. If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, H.

J.aber Division Manager - Nuclear Engineering HJFIEPM/epm Attachment c:

INPO Records Center Employment with Equal Opportunity 47 4171

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMP APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons Ilearned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIN(Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001, or by internet e-mail LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) to Infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202. (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget, Washington. DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control for equied umbe ofnumber, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the (See reverse fo eurdnme finformation collection.

digits/characters for each block)

3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 7
4. TITLE

__________Inadequate Design Control Results in Potentially Insufficient Auxiliary Feedwater Flow

5. EVENT DATE
6. LER NUMBER
7. REPORT DATE
8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 AM OCE NME OPEATIG
1. HISREORTISFACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 07 2006 2006 002 00 09 05 2006 05000
9. OPRTN 1TIRP SSUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)

MODE 02.21()[

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El 20.2203((d()

[:] 20.2203(a)(4)i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0________E 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

[3 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

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E3 50.73(a)(2)(x)

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ElOTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

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Specify in Abstract below or in (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Farm 366A) (17)

Station personnel have reviewed PED-QP-3 "Calculation Preparation, Review and Approval" and other configuration change related procedures to determine if adequate direction is provided to determine if a multidisciplinary review is required. Procedure changes to prevent recurrence of this event will be initiated as appropriate. These procedure changes and other additional actions will be completed as part of the corrective action system.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

While the failure of instrument bus number 1 during an auxiliary fee dwater demand could result in inadequate performance of FW-6 for the purpose of decay heat removal, the likelihood of such failure is very small. Electrical components designated as safety related are qualified in accordance with IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 344-1975 (Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment) and IEEE 323-1983 (Standard for Qualifying IlE Equipment for Mild and Harsh Environment). Additional research for the non-safety related control loop components for FCV-1368 has indicated that there is documentation to demonstrate that the non-safety related control loop components for FCV-1368 were purchased as safety related devices. Further, review of seismic documentation for the control loop components identified seismic qualification reports or equivalent documentation for all of the control devices. All of these devices are seismically mounted and are located in a mild environment. It has been concluded that the control loop devices were purchased and mounted as safety related devices and will perform in an acceptable manner, without failure, in the event of an auxiliary feedwater demand scenario.

Non-safety related instrument bus AI-42A and associated components including inverter #1, bypass transformer EE-4S, associated power and control cables and distribution circuit breakers are all designated as non-safety related. However, they are expected to perform reliably in a manner consistent with safety related counterparts for the following reasons: 1) all components are virtually identical to corresponding components in safety related instrument buses. Inverter #1 was designed and built to the same level of quality as the safety related inverters and is seismically mounted. 2)

Inverter #1 is located such that separation is maintained from instrument power of the opposite train.

3) Non-safety related Instrument Bus #1 is mounted in a panel which is identical to safety related instrument bus panels. 4) Cables for Instrument Bus #1 are identical in quality to those used for safety related bus applications. 5) Inverters and breakers are maintained and tested to the same level of rigor as safety related devices. 6) Non-safety related bus components have historically performed at a high level since their installation in the mid 1980s. 7) The power source for Inverter #1 is DC Bus #1, a highly reliable source of power, backed up by a safety related battery, which also supplies the safety related inverters.

1 (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DIAGRAM FW-FW-663 1317 Normally Isolated because the addition of IDENSATE fCondensate to the EFWST will alterl the FILL chemistry of the AFW System.

DEMIN WATER FILL NORMALLY ISOLATED BECAUSE LCV.1189 Fcv-Hv WON`TMAlNTAINERWST>

FW.

11101 1103 55,000 GALLONS 149

---FPEMERG FILL CONNECTION IFw.-4FW-IF Figure 1