05000285/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Develop Adequate Procedures for Post Modification Testing |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1., for failure to establish, implement, and maintain a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A. Specifically, the licensee failed to develop adequate procedures for testing equipment important to safety. The licensee failed to identify and mitigate all possible turbine logic trip signals when testing Distributed Control System logic. Following the logic modification of the Turbine Control System, post modification testing inserted two Emergency Trip System test signals which caused an automatic turbine trip resulting in an automatic reactor protective system scram actuation. Failure to establish, implement, and maintain procedures as required by technical specifications is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the procedure quality attribute of the initiating event cornerstone to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the licensee failed to mitigate all possible turbine trip signals while testing the Distributed Control System which caused the turbine to trip and thereby caused a loss of load reactor trip. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because although the deficiency resulted in a reactor trip, the trip was uncomplicated and mitigating equipment remained unaffected. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the teamwork component of the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not ensure that individuals and work groups communicate across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the Distributed Control System expert did not review the post modification testing procedure prior to implementation [H.4]. |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2016002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Miller M Williams S Janicki S Schneider S Money |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2016002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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