05000275/FIN-2013007-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Evaluate the Effects on the Emergency Diesel Generator Load Capability for Maximum Combustion Air Temperature Conditions |
| Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, which states, in part, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Specifically, as of July 11, 2013, the licensee failed to evaluate the impact of the site combustion air temperature and the vendor-specified diesel generator rating for combustion air temperature in the emergency diesel generator loading analysis. In addition, the licensee failed to evaluate the available combustion air temperature for the maximum site outside air conditions could have affected the capability of safetyrelated equipment to respond to initiating events. This finding was entered into the corrective action program as Notifications DN-50573049 and DN-50570764. The team determined that the failure to properly evaluate the vendor stated effects of combustion air temperature on the diesel generator capability and to determine and evaluate the expected maximum value for diesel generator combustion air temperature, based on site-specific conditions, was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, using actual data, the licensee found that derating of 1.5 percent was necessary under limiting air temperature conditions. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a design or qualification deficiency that did not result in the loss of operability or functionality, did not result in a loss of safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. This finding had a problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect associated with thoroughly evaluating problems such that the resolution addresses cause and extent of condition. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2013007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz C Osterholtz B Sherbin S Kobylarz R Latta J Watkins C Hale |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2013007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||