05000275/FIN-2012008-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Compensatory Measures for Fire Protection Program Deficiencies |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of License Conditions 2.C(4) for Unit 1 and 2.C(5) for Unit 2, Fire Protection Program, due to the licensees failure to establish or adequately implement compensatory measures for non-compliances with the licensees approved fire protection program. These non-compliances were identified during the licensees ongoing transition to a new fire protection program in compliance with National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, (NFPA 805). The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Notifications 50521360 and 50531363. The failure to establish or maintain appropriate compensatory measures for identified deficiencies in the approved fire protection program was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A senior reactor analyst evaluated the significance of this performance deficiency. A fire that results in the loss of switchgear room ventilation would cause a loss of all ac and dc power if operators did not take action to recover cooling. The analyst determined that the licensed operators would have at least two clear annunciators indicating that ventilation had been lost and that room temperatures were increasing. Additionally, Procedure CP-M10, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment, was available to assist in providing portable fan cooling to the rooms. For a fire to result in an intersystem loss of coolant accident, it would have to cause a 3-phase hot short on both of two shutdown cooling suction valves. Given that each valve is on a different electrical train, the analyst determined that the conditional probabilities of the hot shorts involved would best be modeled as independent. Accounting for the risk associated with both issues evaluated, the analyst estimated the change to core damage probability to be 1.5 x 10-7 per unit. Therefore, the performance deficiency was considered to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it was not indicative of the licensees present performance. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2012008 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Alferink J Mateychick B Correll N Okonkwo G Miller |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2012008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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