IR 05000275/2013005

IR 05000275-13-005 and 05000323-13-005, Diablo Canyon Power Plant -NRC Integrated, Errata

ML14209A872
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	07/25/2014
From:	Webb Patricia Walker NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To:	Halpin E Pacific Gas & Electric Co
Walker W
References
IR-13-005
Download: ML14209A872 (5)

Text

UNITED STATES uly 25, 2014

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2013005 and 05000323/2013005 ERRATA

Dear Mr. Halpin:

Please replace pages 27 and A-2 from the NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2013005 and 05000323/2013005 and replace them with the pages enclosed in this letter. The purpose of this change is to correct the numbering of Non-Cited Violation 05000275;05000323/2012008-04 to 05000275;05000323/2013005-04.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Wayne C. Walker, Branch Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000275: 05000323 License Nos: DPR-80, DPR-82 Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 05000275/2013005 and 05000323/2013005 Pages 27 and A-2.

ML14209A872 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available Keyword:

By: TDB Sensitive Non-Publicly Available NRC-002 OFFICE SPE:DRP/A SRI:DRP/A C:PBA NAME TBuchanan:PBH THipschman WWalker SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/E /RA/

DATE 07/22/14 07/25/14 07/25/14

Letter to Edward from Wayne C. Walker dated July 25, 2014 SUBJECT: DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2013005 and 05000323/2013005 ERRATA cc w/Enclosure:

Electronic Distribution for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

Acting DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Thomas.Hipschman@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (John.Reynoso@nrc.gov)

Administrative Assistant (Madeleine.Arel-Davis@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/A (Wayne.Walker@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (Ryan.Alexander@nrc.gov)

Acting Senior Project Engineer, DRP/A (Theresa.Buchanan@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/A (Brian.Cummings@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

Project Manager (Peter.Bamford@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Geoffrey.Miller@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Anthony.Bowers@nrc.gov)

ROPreports

and-off cycling of the pressurization fan, the control room ventilation recirculation mode would not be sustained upon a Phase A containment isolation or radiation monitor actuation. However, Mode 4 CRVS operation could be sustained by control room operator manual action taken as directed by DCPP Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," Appendix E, "ESP Auto Actions, Secondary and Auxiliaries Status."

Analysis. The failure to use proper design control during the CRVS modification was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radiological releases caused by accidents or events, and is therefore a finding. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because only the radiological barrier function of the control room was affected. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance resources component because licensee staff did not maintain complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation. Specifically, because the functions of the pressure switches and CRVS interlocks had never been adequately described in design control documents H.2(c).

Enforcement. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in

§ 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems, and components. Contrary to the above, in October 2012, the licensee completed a design change to the control room ventilation system that resulted in none of the four CRVS pressurization fans being able to continuously operate if they started in response to a Phase A containment isolation or control room radiation atmosphere intake actuation signal. This resulted in declaring the Units 1 and 2 CRVS actuation instrumentation and CRVS inoperable and an unplanned entry into Technical Specifications (TS) 3.3.7,

"Control Room Ventilation System Actuation Instrumentation," and TS 3.7.10,

"Control Room Ventilation System," respectively. Because this finding was of very low safety significance and was entered into the corrective action program as Notification 50525605, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000275;05000323/2013005-04, Loss of Control Room Ventilation System Due to Inadequate Design Control.

.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000275/1-2013-004-00: All Three Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators Momentarily Inoperable On June 23, 2103, following a loss of 230kV offsite power, Unit 1 control room operators did not enter LCO 3.0.3 when they simultaneously made all three emergency diesel generators inoperable by simultaneously placing them all in manual. When 230kV startup power to the site was lost due to an electrical fault on the grid, all diesel

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000275/2013005-01 URI Procedures for Recommending Protective Actions for Members05000323/2013005-01 of the Public on the Pacific Ocean (Section 1EP5)

Opened and Closed 05000323/2013005-02 NCV Reactor Trip due to a Lightning Arrester Flashover (Section 4OA3.1)05000275/2013005-03 FIN Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Due to a Main Feedwater Pump Trip (Section 4OA3.2)05000275/2013005-04 NCV Loss of Control Room Ventilation System due to Inadequate 05000323/2013005-04 Design Control (Section 4OA3.3)

Closed 05000323/2-2013-005- LER Unit 2 Reactor Trip due to Lightning Arrester Flashover 01 (Section 4OA3.1)

05000275/1-2013-007- LER Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Due to a Main Feedwater Pump 00 Trip (Section 4OA3.2)

05000275; 05000323/ LER Loss of Control Room Ventilation System due to Inadequate 1-2012-008-00 Design Control (Section 4OA3.3)

05000275/1-2013-004- LER All Three Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators Momentarily 00 Inoperable (Section 4OA3.4)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection Procedures Number Title Revision OP J-2 Off-site Power Sources 9 Drawings Number Title Revision 502110 500/230/25/12/4kV Systems 19 A-2