05000275/FIN-2012003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure for the Control of Tools for Use on Stainless Steel |
| Description | Inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.e, for the failure to follow procedures that ensured hand files and wire brushes designated for stainless steel weld preparation were stored and maintained separately from hand files and wire brushes used on carbon steel. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee was not segregating tools as required by Procedure MA1.ID12, Control of Tools for Use on Stainless Steel, Revision 1, because inspectors observed rust deposits on stainless steel components in the plant. This indicated that carbon steel contaminated tools may have been used on these systems. The licensee took corrective actions to segregate the stainless steel tools that were mixed with tools used on carbon steel. The licensee established segregated locations in tool rooms for the separation of abrasive tools, trained tool room attendants to properly store and mark abrasive tools designated for use on stainless steel and evaluated the systems with indications of rust deposits. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Notifications 50475217 and 50475779. Failure to assure that hand files and wire brushes designated for exclusive use on stainless steel were stored separately from tools used on other materials was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the issue would not result in exceeding the technical specification limit for identified reactor coolant system leakage or affect other mitigating systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, in that the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. |
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2012003 Section 1R08 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.08 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson M Peck L Willoughby N O'Keefe N Greene N Makris |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)
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