05000272/FIN-2013003-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow the Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 Procedure and Programs, resulted from operators failure to implement the loss of condenser vacuum procedure. Specifically, operators failed to follow S1.OP-AB.COND-0001, Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum, which directed closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). This resulted in the inability to potentially recover the condenser as a heat sink, after the loss of circulating water (CW) pumps initiator was recovered, due to the actuation of the 11 low pressure (LP) turbine shell rupture disk. Corrective actions from the cause evaluation include developing additional abnormal operating procedure guidance to address a loss of all CW pumps, and designing simulator training scenarios to focus on secondary plant stabilization following reactor and turbine trips. The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was considered associated with the initiating events cornerstone since it occurred during recovery actions after the reactor trip. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) per IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Appendix A, Exhibit 1 Initiating Events, Section B, Transient Initiators, because the PD did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Specifically, the PD occurred after the reactor trip and resulted in the loss of one system (main condenser) of a number of available mitigation systems used to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. The PD did not cause the initiating event of a loss of condenser heat sink, but instead it only affected the ability to potentially recover the heat sink after CW was restored. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, in that PSEG did not ensure that the crew was skilled in secondary plant stabilization and recovery. Specifically, PSEG did not ensure that the training program previously focused on the secondary plant stabilization and / or recovery post trip. |
| Site: | Salem  |
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| Report | IR 05000272/2013003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Modes R Barkley F Arner G Dentel R Nimitz R Rolph J Hawkins P Mckenna M Orr E Bonney M Draxton |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000272/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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