05000272/FIN-2013003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Follow Radiation Protection Procedures to Identify and Control Access to Locked High Radiation Area |
Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance associated with failure to implement TS 6.8 procedures. Specifically, the inspectors identified that PSEG did not implement radiation protection procedure requirements associated with survey and access control to the Unit 2 reactor cavity on November 7, 2012, resulting in lack of identification and control of a TS 6.12, Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA). PSEG entered this issue into their CAP as Notification 20582871. The failure to implement TS required radiation protection procedures is a PD. The PD was determined to be more than minor because it was related to the programs and process attribute of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine reactor operation. Further, if left uncorrected, the PD had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if the LHRA was undetected. The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, 2 Enclosure, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP, dated August 19, 2008, and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not related to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), did not result in an overexposure or a substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise PSEGs ability to assess dose. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control. Specifically, PSEG did not effectively coordinate this work activity by incorporating actions to address the impact of the work on different job activities, and the need for work groups to maintain interfaces and communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other during activities in which interdepartmental coordination is necessary to assure plant and human performance. |
Site: | Salem ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000272/2013003 Section 2RS1 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Or Safety |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.01 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Modes R Barkley F Arner G Dentel R Nimitz R Rolph J Hawkins P Mckenna M Orr E Bonney M Draxton |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000272/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Salem)
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