05000272/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified because PSEG did not complete corrective actions to address degraded valve bearings (i.e., installing new bearings) identified by technicians during SW check valve maintenance in 2010. As a result, binding of the valve disk occurred, which allowed silt accumulation to occur on the valve seat, which prevented the check valve from closing during testing on October 23, 2012. Corrective actions included updating the procedure and ensuring detailed explanations of unsatisfactory conditions that will result in the appropriate use of mode holds during outages that ensures completion of significant corrective action items. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it affected the containment configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure of the check valve to fully close due to silt accumulation, impacted operability of a containment fan cooling unit (CFCU) SW accumulator, which degraded the affected CFCUs cooling water flow, reducing their containment heat removal capacity, which could affect containment integrity if the affected CFCUs were relied upon for containment cooling during an event. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization, and Exhibit 3 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not represent an actual pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor containment, containment isolation system, or heat removal components. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because PSEG did not effectively communicate expectations regarding compliance with procedures. Specifically, PSEG did not install parts required by the internal inspection procedure that led to the check valve being inoperable. |
| Site: | Salem  |
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| Report | IR 05000272/2013002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Barr G Dentel J Laughlin R Rolph E Burket P Mckenna E Bonney |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Salem - IR 05000272/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Salem) @ 2013Q1
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