05000263/FIN-2010004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Electrical Isolation during Demolition Activity |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed when the licensee failed to adequately implement the requirements of their fleet tagging procedure, a procedure affecting quality, during the demolition of the A train of the combustion gas control system (CGCS). This failure directly led to workers being unprotected from existing 24 Vdc, and potentially 120 Vac, during the removal of cables C259-SV40008A/1 and C259-SV4009A/1. In addition, cutting of the energized cables resulted in the loss of position indication for three primary containment isolation valves which are required by Technical Specifications. The licensee promptly took actions to restore the affected containment isolation valves to an operable status and entered this event into their corrective action program for further evaluation. The inspectors determined that the contributing cause that provided the most insight into the performance deficiency was associated with the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, having work control components, and involving aspects associated with appropriately coordinating work activities by incorporating job site conditions which may impact human performance and plant systems and components. H.3(a) The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to adequately implement their work order planning and tagging processes to protect workers and equipment from existing electrical hazards during the demolition of the A train of the CGCS system was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement; the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct; and should have been prevented. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Since the finding directly resulted in the loss of position indication for three containment isolation valves which are required by Technical Specifications, the inspectors evaluated the finding under the Containment Barrier Cornerstone. Utilizing Column 4 of the Table 4a worksheet, the inspectors answered Yes to question 1. Since the finding only resulted in the degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room, auxiliary building, spent fuel pool, or standby gas treatment (SBGT) system, the finding was screened to be of very low safety significance. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2010004 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling S Thomas L Haeg K Reimer A Scarbeary D Sand |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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