05000263/FIN-2009005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Maintenance Procedure for A SBGT System |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the licensees failure to include acceptance criteria appropriate to the circumstances for a preventive maintenance procedure for the A standby gas treatment (SBGT) subsystem. Due to the lack of a specific caution to avoid over-tightening of bolts for installation of a blocking device on the A SBGT subsystem suction valve (AO-2945), the valve failed to open during return-to-service testing on September 29, 2009. Failure of AO-2945 to open resulted in an inadvertent initiation of the B SBGT subsystem due to a low flow condition. The licensee took immediate corrective actions and entered the issue into their corrective action program. In order to re-perform return-to-service testing of the A SBGT subsystem after the AO-2945 issue was resolved, the B SBGT subsystem had to be shutdown, requiring entry into limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.0.3 due to the inoperability of both SBGT subsystems. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency affected the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, having corrective action program components, and involving aspects associated with identifying issues completely and accurately commensurate with their safety significance. P.1(a) The inspectors determined that the issue was a performance deficiency because it was the result of the failure to meet a requirement, and the cause was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor and a finding because it involved the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings to this finding. Under Column 4 of the Table 4a worksheet, the inspectors answered Yes to Question 1 because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided by the SBGT system. Therefore, the finding was considered to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R12 |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2009005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | P Smagacz J Corujo-Sandin K Riemer D Reeser M Garza S Thomas M Bielby L Haeg P Zurawski T Go J Bozga |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2009005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2009Q4
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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