05000261/LER-2018-001, Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator

Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator

ML19016A084
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	01/16/2019
From:	Ellis K Duke Energy Progress
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA-19-0009 LER 2018-001-00
Download: ML19016A084 (5)

LER-2018-001, Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
2612018001R00 - NRC Website

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JAN 16 2019 Serial: RA-19-0009 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington. OC 20555-0001 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-261/RENEWEO LICENSE NO. OPR-23 Subject LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2018-001-00:

Kerlln* M. EJtis H. B. Robinson Steam BedlicPlaat. Unit 2 Manager-~Suppott Sentkas DukBEnergy 35Bt West Entmnt;e RDad Hartsvflle,SC 29650

0. 843 951 1329 F: 843 95i 1319 KewaEliis@duke<<nergy.am, 10CFR50.73 VAUD ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR Ladies and Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Duke Energy Progress. LLC is submitting the attached Licensee Event Report. There are no unresolved corrective actions neoessary to restore compliance with NRC requirements. Please direct any questions regarding this submittal to Justin M. Wild, Senior licensing Engineer, Regulatory Affairs, at (843) 951-3283.

This document contains no new regulatory commitments.

Sincerely, Kevin M. Ellis Manager - Nuclear Support Services KME/jmw Attachment c:

Region Administrator, NRC, Region II NRC Resident Inspectors, HBRSEP N. Jordan, NRC Project Manager, NRR

United States INudear Regu'.latmy Commission Attachme.nt to Seriat RA-19-0009 4 Pages fmduding this page)

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ElECTRiC PLANT, UNJT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2018-081-00:

VALID ACTUAT1ON OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

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2. Docket Number 3..Page H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 05000 261 1

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4. Tllle Vafld Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator

5. Event Date

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12. Ucansea Contact for this LER Licensee Contact Telephone Number (lndude Alea Code)

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14. Supplemental Report Expected llon1II Day Yur 0 Yn (If yes, complele 15. Expecled Submission Date)

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15. Expected Submission Date Abstract (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 14 single-spaced typewritten lines)

At 1916 hours0.0222 days <br />0.532 hours <br />0.00317 weeks <br />7.29038e-4 months <br /> eastern daylight time on 11/19/2018 with the plant in Mode 5, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP2), experienced a valid actuation of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) due to low voltage on the E2 Emergency Bus.

Subsequent investigation determined that during activities associated with a wori< order task. an E2 supply breaker tripped resulting in the automatic actuation of the 'B' EOG. Consequently, the 'B' Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump (MDAFW) actuated due to logic associated with the E2 undervoltage signal. Normal E2 bus voltage supply was restored and 'B' EDG and

'B' MOAFW pump were secured. The direct cause of the EOG actuation was inadequate procedure adherence during maintenance activities.

The automatic actuations of the 'B' EOG and 'B' MOAFW pump are valid system actuations and are reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

NRC FORM 366 (04-2018)

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NARRATIVE

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The onsite standby power source[JX) for each 480 V Engineered Safety Features (ESF) bus{BUJ is a dedicated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)1()GJ. EOGs 'A: and 'B' are dedicated to ESF buses E1 and E2, respectivety. An EOG starts automatically on an ESF bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal and automatically ties to its respective bus after offsite power is losl Loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic load sequencer{34]. The following loads are connected to E2 once the 'B' EOG is connected following an undervoltage condition: 'C' and 'D' SeMce Water pumps[PJ, the Service Water Booster pumps, 'C' Component Cooling Water pump, and 'B' Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump.

The Auxiliary Feedwater {AFW) System{BAJ can provide feedwater to the steam generators[SGJ for decay heat removal if main feedwater is not available or steam generator level is not adequate. The system provides feedwater from any one or combination of three AFW pumps, two are MDAFW pumps and the third is steam driven. The two motor-driven pumps are supplied power from the emergency buses E1 and E2. The steam-driven pump can be operated independent of electrical power where steam produced from decay heat drives the turbine[fRB].

An 8-hour notification was made on 11/1912018 to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Operations Center (Event Notification 53745). The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a}{2)(iv)(A), any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems rtSted in paragraph (a)(2}(iv)(B) of this section, except when: (1} the actuation resulted from and was part of a pre-planned sequence during testing of reactor operation; or (2) the actuation was invalid and; (i) occurred while the system was properly removed from service; or (ii} occurred after the safety function had been already completed. This criterion requires a 60-day licensee event report be submitted within 60-days of the event date.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 11/19/2018 H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP2) was in Mode 5 with personnel conducting activities in support of a work order task intended to validate that the field wiring matched the current design drawings. A pre-job brief was conducted with the crew assigned the task. They were provided with a copy of the work order and drawing of the incorrect revision. As the crew began troubleshooting, they identified wires that needed to be reconfigured to match the drawing in hand. During reconfiguration, while landing a wire lead to a terminal strip in 4KV breaker cubicle 52/47, the E2 supply breaker[BKR] 52/48 tripped open. This caused Emergency Bus E2 to separate from its normal offsite power source, resulting in the actuation of the 'B' EOG.

Following the start of the 'B' EOG, all required loads sequenced on at the proper intervals, and all Reactor Coolant System[AB}/Residual Heat Removal System[BPJ parameters remained within established bands. The components supporting core cooling, powered by the opposite train electrical bus, were in service and protected prior to the event and remained unaffected.

The following sequence of events provides a concise chronological description of the operation of plant equipment surrounding the safety system actuation.

Date:

Time: Event:

11/19/2018: 1916 - 'B' EOG started on undervoltage and EOG 'B' output supply breaker closed. All loads started as expected, including 'B' MOAFW pump.

1926 - 'B' MDAFW pump secured 11/20/2018: 0345-EOG 'B' shutdown CAUSAL FACTORS The task crew, comprised of contracted supplemental craft, who are not licensed personnel, utilized an inoorrea drawing revision while perfonning woTk in the field. Supplemental craft cfld not clearly understand where to properly validate the most recent drawing revision, in accordance with site procedure, prior to performing work in the field. Additionally, leadership failed to provide adequate oversight to ensure the supplemental craft and supervision knew, understood, and adhered to the standards regarding the requirement to verify reoords prior to working in the field.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Complete:

1. Correct revision of the drawing was provided to the task crew and the wiring discrepancy was corrected.

2. Conduct coaching of vendors and managers to reinforce the expectations regarding verifying records prior to working in the field in accordance with procedure.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

There is no safety consequence as a result of this event. The 'A' train components supporting core cooling were in seivice and protected prior to the event and remained unaffected. The actuation of the 'B' EOG was valid, and the system responded to plant conditions as designed. The cause was attributed to inadequate procedure adherence and not due to any equipment failures. This event resulted in no impact to the health and safety of the public.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

An operating experience (OE} search was conducted and there were no prior events at HBRSEP2 involving inadvertent actuation of the onsite standby AC power system with a subsequent actuation of the AFW system within the past three years.

Energy Industry ldentifteation System (EIIS) codes for systems and components relevant to this event are identified in the text of this document within brackets [ ]. Page 3

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