05000259/FIN-2012010-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Incomplete and inaccurate information provided in Generic Letter 89-10 response |
| Description | 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on January 6, 1997, and May 5, 2004, TVA provided information to the Commission that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance testing program. Specifically, in a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA responded to a prior NRC question, and stated that Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no redundant safety function and will not be included in the GL 89-10 program. This information was inaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode as described in EOI Appendix-17A, RHR System Operation Suppression Pool Cooling, and should therefore have been included in Browns Ferrys GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. Additionally, TVA also provided incomplete and inaccurate information in a letter to the NRC dated May 5, 2004. This letter referenced 18 valves, including valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, that are not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position. This letter stated that TVAs review and documentation of the design basis for the operation of each Unit 1 MOV within the scope of the GL 89-10 program, the methods for determining and adjusting its switch settings, testing, surveillance, and maintenance are the same as with the Units 2 and 3 program. This information was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for determining that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 did not meet the conditions necessary that would require them to be in Browns Ferrys GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. This is a Severity Level III violation. |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2012010 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level III |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Guthrie L Casey C Kontz L Wert C Evans R Croteau |
| Violation of: | Pending |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2012010 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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