05000259/FIN-2011004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Properly Install Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Booster Pump Outboard Bearings |
| Description | A licensee-identified apparent violation of Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a was identified for the licensee failing to establish an adequate maintenance instruction for properly installing the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) booster pump outboard bearing. On July 20, 2011, visual inspections confirmed the booster pump outboard bearing was installed incorrectly and exhibited severe damage. The licensee replaced the HPCI booster pump outboard bearing and the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as problem evaluation reports (PER) 405165 and 408067. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of Equipment Performance and Procedure Quality, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the work package to replace the HPCI booster pump outboard bearing did not include sufficiently detailed instructions to ensure that the bearings were installed in the correct back to back arrangement. Failure to correctly install the HPCI booster pump bearing resulted in severe bearing damage that would have eventually led to a failure of the Unit 1 HPCI pump. The significance of this finding was characterized using Inspector Manual Chapter (IMC) 609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Attachment 04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, which did not screen as Green for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone because it involved a loss of system safety function. A further characterization of the safety significance was then performed using IMC 609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. The Phase 2 SDP of Appendix A determined the finding to be potentially greater than very low safety significance (Green) based on the Browns Ferry Phase 2 pre-solved table. Since this finding was potentially greater than Green it will necessitate a Phase 3 SDP to characterize the safety significance. Because the safety significance of this finding has not been finalized, it will be designated as To Be Determined (TBD). No crosscutting aspect was assigned because the incorrect bearing installation did not occur within the past three years, and therefore, was not reflective of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
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| Report | IR 05000259/2011004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Kontz C Stancil E Guthrie L Pressley P Niebaum R Baldwin T Rossc Stancile Guthrie L Pressley P Niebaum T Ross |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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