05000255/FIN-2013003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Corrective Action Process for Service Water Leaks |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-citied violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to adhere to the requirements of the sites corrective action process. Specifically, the station failed to complete corrective actions to address cavitation-induced erosion of service water system components, which resulted in additional through-wall leaks and other adverse conditions in that safety-related system. Since 1993, this phenomenon caused several through wall leaks and the failure of a valve, which isolated normal service water flow to a component cooling water heat exchanger. Corrective actions to replace valves susceptible to this type of erosion were not implemented, and actions to utilize more effective non-destructive examination (NDE) techniques to assess piping or development of pre-emptive repair/replacement strategies were not performed, resulting in further leaks from the service water system. The current corrective action process procedure, EN-LI-102, states that corrective actions are determined, implemented, and adequate to resolve conditions. The licensee entered the issue in their corrective action program (CAP) as CR- PLP-2013-05813. The issue was determined to be greater than minor in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix B, Issue Screening, issue date September 7, 2012, because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone whose objective is to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, a through wall leak can challenge the integrity of the piping and system function. The inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) utilizing IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, issue date June 2, 2011. Specifically, in Attachment 4, issue date June 19, 2012, utilizing Exhibit 2 of Appendix A, all questions in Section A were answered no since the leaks did not result in a loss of safety function. The finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution for the operating experience component. Specifically, the licensee did not implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to station processes and procedures. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2013003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Holmberg C Zoia J Lennartz T Taylor J Gilliam A Scarbeary R Edwards |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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