05000255/FIN-2012005-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Immediate Operability Determination |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, for the failure to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process. After discovering a non-isolable steam leak on a main steam header drain valve (an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 2 system) at approximately 2:30 a.m., the licensee failed to perform the steps specified in EN-OP-104 to expeditiously evaluate and to document a basis for operability. In addition, EN-OP-104 required input from engineering to be obtained for an ASME Class 2 thru-wall leak. However, the night-shift operators did not obtain input from engineering and did not document the basis for operability. After day-shift took over in the morning around 6:30 am, engineering and management were contacted and more rigorous efforts to assess operability commenced. The licensee subsequently declared the associated primary coolant system (PCS) loop, which requires an operable steam generator, to be inoperable at 11:15 am (approximately 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> after the condition was initially documented) and shut down the plant to repair the leak. The inspectors determined that not completing an immediate determination in accordance with EN-OP-104 caused an unnecessary delay in commencing a plant shutdown to repair the non-isolable leak. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-PLP-2013-00158. The issue was determined to be greater than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, because if left uncorrected, it could lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to perform an immediate operability determination when assessing safety-related components, including a delay in requesting assistance, could lead to more significant issues. The performance deficiency also affected the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, adversely impacting the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip AND a loss of accident mitigation equipment. The finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the decision-making component of the human performance area because the night-shift operators did not obtain interdisciplinary input and reviews on the safety-significant operability decision. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2012005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Taylor A Scarbeary J Corujo-Sandin J Beavers S Shah M Holmberg J Cassidy S Sheldon J Lennartz J Laughlin D Betancourt |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Palisades) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||