05000250/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Timely Corrective Actions to Test Molded Case Circuit Breakers |
| Description | The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to establish a test program to demonstrate that safety-related 120 VAC and 125 VDC molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) would be able to reliably perform their intended safety functions, specifically protective tripping. The team identified that since 2005 and 2006, when the lack of periodic testing of the molded case circuit breakers was identified, no interim measures were taken to correct the nonconforming condition. Additionally, the team identified that the licensee failed to scope the protective tripping function of the MCCBs in the maintenance rule program. Upon identification by the team, the licensee entered these issues into their correction action program as ARs 1675539, 1676808, 1788355, and 1852219. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee tested 35 breakers which performed satisfactorily. The results of this testing and an action to develop a long-term test program for the entire 120 VAC and 125 VAC MCCBs were documented in AR 1852219. A license amendment will also be pursued to allow for more TS outage time in order to remove and replace the more difficult MCCBs. The licensees failure to implement prompt and effective corrective actions to ensure that safetyrelated molded case circuit breakers were adequately tested was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening using Exhibit 2 of Appendix A to Manual Chapter 0609 and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in the loss of operability or functionality. Because the licensee did not ensure that the necessary resources were available and adequate to maintain long term plant safety through the minimization of preventative maintenance deferrals, this finding is assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area. |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2013002 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera R Kellner W Pursley M Riley W Loo T Hoeg M Barillas D Mas-Penaranda D Rich C Fletcher |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.6, Design Margins |
| INPO aspect | WP.2 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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