05000250/FIN-2012005-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Verify 1B Feedwater Heater Drain Valve Closed |
| Description | A self-revealing finding was identified when the licensee failed to follow procedure 0-ADM-222, Drain and Vent Rig Controls, while installing a temporary drain hose on Turkey Point Unit 4 in-service equipment. Operations and maintenance workers failed to verify a drain line flow path was isolated on the 1B feed water heater prior to removing a pipe valve cap that resulted in an unexpected lowering of condenser vacuum. Operators took action to close the open drain line isolation valve and terminate the plant transient. The licensee captured this condition in their corrective action program as AR 1819010. The licensees failure to verify the closed position of 1B feed water heater drain valve 4- 30-128, as required by procedure 0-ADM-222, prior to removing the pipe cap was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because the performance deficiency was associated with the configuration control attribute of the initiating events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, the failure to verify the position of 4-30-128 resulted in lowering condenser vacuum that could have led to a reactor trip and the unavailability of the main condenser. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the significance determination process for findings at power of IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Transient Initiators. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not result in a reactor trip and a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. The finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not define and effectively communicate expectations, or follow the procedural requirement to physically verify valve position during the drain hose installation work. |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2012005 Section 1R11 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.11 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Taylor G Kuzo J Laughlin T Hoeg M Barillas D Mas-Penaranda S Sandal A Zoulis P Capehart M Coursey C Fletcher J Stewart A Vargas W Pursley |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||