05000250/FIN-2012004-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | The licensee identified that Unit 3 train 2 auxiliary feedwater flow control valve FCV-3- 2832 was rendered inoperable when a maintenance technician installed a cap over the solenoid vent port. The cap was installed after removal of test equipment. Turkey Point Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures required by the FPL Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) be maintained and implemented. The topical report includes procedures for control of maintenance and specifies that maintenance procedures contain instructions in sufficient detail to permit maintenance work to be performed correctly. The licensee met this requirement, in part, with work order 40181373-01, written for the investigation and testing of train 2 auxiliary feedwater flow control valve (FCV-3-2832) following observed erratic operation. After the testing was completed, the work order required the maintenance technician to un-install the test equipment. Contrary to the above, on September 18, 2012, work order 40181373-01 did not contain instructions in sufficient detail to un-install the test equipment correctly, and a technician mistakenly placed a cap over a solenoid vent line for FCV-3-2832, making the valve unable to close after being opened by an actuation signal. The error was discovered by the licensee during a planned auxiliary feedwater test conducted the next day. When discovered, the licensee entered the appropriate technical specification action, removed the cap to restore operability to the valve, and demonstrated operability by completing a surveillance test. The inspectors evaluated the event using NRC Inspection Manual 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports; Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings; and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding was screened as being of very low safety significance (Green) when all screening questions in IMC 0609 Appendix A were answered no . Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered in the licensees corrective action program as AR 1804442, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2012004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Taylor M Barillas A Hutto D Rich J Stewart M Donithan |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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