05000219/LER-1982-002, Forwards LER 82-002/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards LER 82-002/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20041D573
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 02/19/1982
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20041D574 List:
References
NUDOCS 8203050423
Download: ML20041D573 (3)


LER-1982-002, Forwards LER 82-002/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191982002R00 - NRC Website

text

e l

GPU Nuclear g

g{

P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Wnter's Direct Dial Number:

February 19, 1982 Mr. Ibnald C. Ilaynes, Adnunstrator Ibgion I Unitcd States Nuclear Regulatory Comnission

^,g 631 Park Avenue 9'7 King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

. ]{ ng,

C C

d

Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

- B

~

~

l09')w" O-SULUIUT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

{

Docket No. 50-219 s.

1."

h",

Licensee Event Report

[,

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-02/3L

,/

This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-02/3L in empliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.3 of the Technical Specifications.

It is recognized that the subnittal of this reportable occurrence is not within the time limitation imposed by paragraph 6.9.2.b of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, h&4a Petdr B. Fiedler Vice President & Director Oyster Creek PBF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcenent United States Nuclear Figulatory CaTmission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Managanent Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Cannission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

G203050423 820219

'Ibp PDR ADOCK 05000219 is a part of the General Public Utilities System S

S PDR

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENEPATIFE STATICN Forkod River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-02/3L Peport Date February 19, 1982 Occurrence Date January 18, 1982 Identification of Occurrence Installation of a nodification which could have led to a possible failure to maintain primary containment integrity with the reactor critical and water tenperature above 212 F.

This condition was due to the installation of under-voltage trip breakers to No. 3 and No. 4 TIP machine drive motor circuits. This would have rendered the autmatic retract and subsequent TIP Ball Valve Closure features inoperable.

'Ihis event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Tech-nical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.3.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating in various operating nodes during the time the condition existed.

Description of Occurrence A modification was cmpleted on No. 3 and No. 4 TIP machine drive motor circuits to rmove non-essential loads on No. 2 diesel generator. This design change defeated the autmatic withdrawal function of No. 3 and No. 4 TIP detectors past the ball valves to the inshield position, if a drywell isolation was required.

If a drywell isolation occurred, sinultaneous with loss of offsite power, diesel running, and a TIP detector cable in residence through the ball valve, the valve would not close. Autmatic detector withdrawal would have been defeated. This would only occur, if a sustained under-voltage condition (loss of startup trans-former) occurred, followed by restoration of power via diesel generator or offsite power.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

'Ihe cause of the occurrence is attributed to an inadequate safety review.

It should be noted that the Plant Operations Review Comittee identified the deficiency, but still approved the modification with the proviso that the undervoltage trip breakers be deleted. Subsequently, the Director - Station-Operations, based upon the PORC recmmendations, approved the modification

4-Reportable Occurrence Pcge 2 Report No. 50-219/82-02/3Lproposal. The concerns expressed by the POPC either did not get to the Engineering Group which prepared the nodification proposal or were overlooked by the cognizant engineer. Ocuplete records of transmittal are not available. As a result the under-voltage trip breakers were installed.

Analysis of Occurrence The containment isolation valves are provided to maintain containment integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accident. The safety significance is minimal, since the failure of the TIP ball valve to close is backed up by manual explosive shear valves.

Corrective Action

The under-voltage trip breakers were rmoved on January 21, 1982, and replaced by the original design breakers. These units were tested on January 22, 1982, which restored the original intent of the systen function.

The POTC practice of approving nodification proposals with "ocuments or changes" will be discontinued. Future modifications will be approved or disapproved as subnitted. ' This corrective action will ensure that all POBC concerns are addressed prior to approval.

The supervisors of the personnel involved in the preparation and safety review of this modification will be notified of the deficiscies.