05000219/LER-1982-010, Forwards LER 82-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20042A106
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 03/04/1982
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20042A107 List:
References
NUDOCS 8203230091
Download: ML20042A106 (3)


LER-1982-010, Forwards LER 82-010/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2191982010R00 - NRC Website

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GPU Nuclear P.O. Box 388 g

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Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

March 4, 1982 0

k Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Adntinstrator p

4 RECDIVED Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Camtission

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L-MAR 2 2 h -1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 n at 9

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Dear Mr. Haynes:

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SURIDCT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-10/0lT This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-10/0lT in otrupliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a.9 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

~

Pe er B. Fiedler Vice President - Director Oyster Creek PBF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission hashington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Managanent Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Cw mission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

8203230091 G20304 PDR ADOCK 05000219 s

PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utihties System

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATlsC3 STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-10/0lT Report Date March 4, 1982 Occurrence Date February 18, 1982 Identification of Occurrence A deficiency existed in the instediation and Safety Evaluation #218.77-8.1 -

Fire Protection Syst m Modification - as it related to protection and assessment of safety-related systs operation in the event of deluge systs actuation.

This could have resulted in operation in a manner less conservative than pre-sented in the safety evaluation.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.9.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was shutdown with reactor water tmperature less than 212 F.

Description of Occurrence On Saturday, January 9, 1982, the Fire Protection deluge systs for Reactor Building Elevation 51' south side actuated due to an overheated bearing in the Clean-up Syst m auxiliary pump motor. Snoke manating frm this bearing caused a logic trip of the south cable tray deluge systs resulting in the wetting of 1

cable trays and other equipnt in the affected area. A D.C. ground condition was traced to the valve ready switch, REDD, which could have rendered a logic channel for the Core Sp: ay Systs inoperable. An A.C. ground fault in the Reactor Protection System also occurred and was traced to the position indicator switches for valves V-23-15 and 16 (N supply to Torus). This resulted in a 2

partial loss of containment isolation valve indication. Both of these faults resulted frm equipnent wetting and an inspection of all switches on instrurent rack RKO2 and vicinity was made to deternune if additional water damage had occurred. As a precautionary measure the Core Spray loop affected was reinoved frm service. No further probles were identified.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence l

The cause of the occurrence is attributed to an inadequate safety evaluation.

Additionally, actions which were identified in the safety evaluation for pro-j tection of certain plant equipnent were never fully cmpleted.

l Specifically, the safety evaluation assumed that existing electrical sealing technigles on most of the plant equipuent was adequate when in fact it was not.

7 The range of spray frm the deluge systs was also underestimated because l

instrument racks judged not to be affected in the evaluation were wetted during l

this occurrence.

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Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/82-10/0lTCertain equipnent identified in the evaluation required drip c.hields and gaskets.

h identified drip shields were installed, but the installation of gaskets and other sealing devices was not empleted.

Analysis of Occurrence The FDSAR describes safety-related equipnent which is required to perform in the event of a transient or other initiating conditions to assure safe operation of the facility under all modes.

The inadequate safety evaluation and incx:stplete installaticn could have resulted in degraded operation of the facility with regard to proper functioning of the safety systms.

For this specific event the failure of RE17D affected the redundancy of the Core Spray Systs. The partial loss of containment isolation valve position indica-tion would not have affected valve operation.

Corrective Action

A revaluation of the integrity of the Reactor Building safety-related eqJipnent with regard to Fire Protection Syst s wetting was performed. The revaluation with designated corrective acticn will be reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Cmmittee (POIC) and approved by the Director - Station Operations. All itms determined to require sealing or drip shield protection will be protected prior to plant startup frm the current shutdown.

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