05000219/LER-1981-052, Forwards LER 81-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20032E982
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/13/1981
From:	Carroll J JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20032E983	List: 05000219/LER-1981-052, Forwards LER 81-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1981-052-03, /03L-0:on 811021,after TIP Trace,Ball Valve on TIP Machine 2 Failed to Close.Caused by Moisture Buildup in TIP Tubes.Switch Replaced,Purge Restored & Operating Arm Cleaned & Tested
References
NUDOCS 8111230573
Download: ML20032E982 (3)

LER-1981-052, Forwards LER 81-052/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191981052R00 - NRC Website

text

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November 13, 1901 f(\\h N

Mr. Ronald llaynes, Director N

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission u,:, m,,.

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Dear Mr. Ilaynes:

O SURIECI': Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-52/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-52/3L in empliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Sprx:ifications.

Very truly yours, j )t%WS

. T. Carroll, J Acting Director Oyster Creek JIC:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Ca mission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Office of Managment Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Ca mission Washington, D. C. 20555 NFC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

'1 PT!wo;;3gg 64 PDR

OYSTER CREEK NUCIIAR GmERATING STATICN Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee L' vent Report '

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-52/3L Report Date Novmber 13, 1981 Occurrence Date October 21, 1981 Identification of Occurrence Operating in a degraded mode as permitted by Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.a when the in-shield limit switch for No. 2 TIP nachine failed to operate, therefore, preventing the Ball valve from autonntically closing on a containment isolation signal.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Power:

Core 1136.51 m t Electrical 398 No 4

Flow:

Recirculation 10.2 x 10 p 6

Feedwater 4.15 x 10 #/lu.

Description of Otece on Wednesday, October 21,1981, at 1220 hours0.0141 days <br />0.339 hours <br />0.00202 weeks <br />4.6421e-4 months <br />, after ampleting a TIP trace, the Ball valve on No. 2 TIP nuchine failed to close. This is a violation of the requirments for maintaining primary containment isolation valve operability.

'the nunually operated shear valve, an in-line valve in the TIP conduit was operational. Subsequent investigation revealed that the in-shield limit switch failed to operate and close the Ball valve.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause of this occurrence was lack of N2 Purge for a period of approximately three days which permittal moisture to collect in the indexer and TIP tubes. The lack of N2 Purge was caused by an autmatic N Purge isola-2 tion which was due to the loss of Reactor Protection Systs power during surveillance testing. This isolation is not alarmed.

The noisture ambines with the Dry coating on the tubes to form a liquid substance which is then deposited on the in-shield limit switch operating arm preventing same fran returning to the operate position.

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Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-52/3L

+

Analysis of Occurrence te.contalment isolation valves are provided to maintain contalment integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accid e t.

Failure of the TIP Ball valve to close is backed up by a a nual explosive shear valve. The safety significance is minimal _.

Corrective Action

t e in-shield limit switch was replaced, N2 purge was restored, the switch operator arm was cleaned, tested and returned to service at 1320 hours0.0153 days <br />0.367 hours <br />0.00218 weeks <br />5.0226e-4 months <br /> on October.21,1981, well within the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> requirement of 'Itachnical Specification 3.5.A.3.a.

A future modification is planned to upgrade the entire TIP Systs,

including replacement of these switches with a more reliable device.

W e applicable procedures will be revised to reset the N2 Purge System following isolstion.

Failure Data-Micro. Switch Company BZE6 - 2BN 15A-125VAC/250/480 VAC Freeport, Illinois i

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