05000219/LER-1981-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 81-035/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20030D400
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	08/21/1981
From:	Carroll J JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20030D401	List: 05000219/LER-1981-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1981-035-03, /03L-0:on 810721,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Discovered.Maint Personnel Erroneously Directed to Filled Penetration & Job Order Closed.Caused by Error in Communication.Fire Watch Established.Penetration Repaired
References
NUDOCS 8109010353
Download: ML20030D400 (3)

LER-1981-035, Forwards LER 81-035/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191981035R00 - NRC Website

text

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION b

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(609)693-6000 P O BOX 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY

• 08731 August 21, 1981 M7 op.

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director

,Q r4 Office of Inspection and Enforcaent i

.d C

f(hj Region I I

Sp' United States Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission f

631 Park Avenue 4

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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Dear Mr. Grier:

SUR7ECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Cenerating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-35/3L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-35/3L in cmpliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b(3) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

/244M J. T. Carroll, Jr.

Acting Director O' Creek JIC:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforecraent United States Nuclear Pagulatory Camission g

Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

/

Office of Managment Information and Program Control United States Nuclear Regulatory Camission Washington, D. C. 20555 NBC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Staticn Forked River, N. J.

8109010353 810821 PDR ADOCK 05000219 6

PDR

o OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATICN Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Limnsee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-35/3L Report Date August 21, 1981

_ Occurrence Date July 21, 1981 Identification of Occurrence Violation of Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.12.E.1 and 3.12.E.2, when a degraded fire barrier.was discovered and no fire watch was established.

m is ev G t is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b(3).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

'Ihe plant was operating at steady state power.

Major Plant Parameters Power:

Reactor 1370 m t Generator 360 me 4

Flow:

Recirculation 12.8 x 10 gpn reedwater 4.19 x 106 lb/hr Description of Occurrence On Tuesday, July 21, 1981, during a Quality Assurance surveillance inspection, it was discovered that a 1/2 inch conduit penetration was not sealed with a fire retardant material. Bis conduit runs frcm the cable spreading rocan to the telemetering panel in the control rocrn.

I Upon notification of this situation, the Group Shift Supervisor prepared a maintenance job order t.a have the penetration sealed; however, since the Group Shift Supervisor believed the penetration would be sealed within the next hour, a fice watch patrol was not established. During the interval between initiating the job order and actually unde _% the repairs, an operator shift change occurred. 'Iha new Group Shift Superviror had been made aware of the degraded penetration; however, he had been misinformed as to its location. Upon directing maintenance personnel to the perceived location of the problem, a filled penetration was found and the maintenance personnel closed the job order as being co P ete.,

l

~ _. _

O Reportable Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-35/3L On July 29, 1981, another Quality Assurance inspection again identified the unsealed penetration. At this time, a fire watch patrol was established while the penetration was repaired.

Apparent Canse of Occurrence me apparent cause of the incident was due to an error in comunications. We second Group Shift Supervisor was searching for the penetration in the wrong location. He was looking for an open penetration in panel 12XR, when in reality, the penetration was in the telenetering equipment panel that is located near the 12R panels. Wis panel did not have a specific numerical designation printed on it, as did the other equignent panels in the Control Rocm.

h is lack of numerical designation created the confusion of the penetration's location.

Analysis of Occurrence Degraded fire barriers increase the possibility of fire spreading fran one area to another. hhile this specific panel does not contain safety related equignent, there are panels in the Control Rocm that possess this concern. We Control Roan is continually manned and hourly readings are taken in the inmediate area of the panel. W erefore, indications of fire or smoke would have been observed.

Adequate manually operated fire suppression equignent was available to contain a fire if it had developed.

Corrective Action

A fire watch of the panel area was begun on July 29 and was continued until the penetration was repaired on the 30th. We penetration was filled with RIV foam penetration sealant which provides a three hour fire barrier. Mose personnel involved with the failure to perform a fire watch were instructed as to the inportance of the fire watch and the necessity to provide infornation to the succeeding shifts.

Additionally, a review of Control Rocm panels will be made to deternine the adequacy of existing panel labels. Any deficiencies discovered during this review will be corrected.