05000206/LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

ML20053E378
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	05/28/1982
From:	Ray H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:	Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
Shared Package
ML20053E379	List: 05000206/LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted 05000206/LER-1982-012-01, /01T-0:on 820510,charging Pump Suction cross-tie Valve 237-4-G42 Closed to Repair Flange Leak on Valve CV-406B.Deficiency Identified & Corrected 820513.Caused by Closing of Valve in Charging Pump Suction
References
NUDOCS 8206070848
Download: ML20053E378 (2)

LER-1982-012, Forwards LER 82-012/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted

Event date:
Report date:
2061982012R00 - NRC Website

text

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Southern California Edison Company 19p y.;

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S AN ONOFRE NUC L E AR GENER A TING S T A TION P.O. B O X 128 S AN C L EMEN T E. C A LIF OR NI A 92672 k

H. B. R A Y T E L EPeeONE S r A r ON A N ^"""

May 28, 1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-206 14 Day Follow-Up Report of LER No.82-012 San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 This submittal provides the 14 day follow-up report for LER 82-012 in accordance with Section 6.9.2.a.(6) of Appendix A to Provisional Operating License DPR-13.

It describes an occurrence resulting in a reduced number of boric acid flow paths to the reactor coolant system. Licensee Event Report 82-012 is attached.

Technical Specification 3.2.A.(4) requires that the Chemical and Volume Control " System piping and valves shall be operable to the extent of establishing two flow paths for the boric acid tanks" whenever fuel is in the reactor.

On May 10,1982, the charging pump suction cross-tie l

valva (237-4"-G42) was closed in order to repair a flange leak on valve i

CV-406B.

Permission was granted to shut this valve without an adequate review of the requirement of maintaining two boration paths. As a l

result, only one boric acid flow path existed for the period from May 10 to May 13,1982. Unit I was in cold shutdown (Mode 5) with both charging l

pumps removed from service at the time of the incident.

Corrective actions that will be taken to prevent recurrence include:

1.

A review and evaluation of equipment control procedures.

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2.

Additional operator training.

pN 3.

A review of the bases for Technical Specification 3.2 to include j

possible credit for an additional boric acid flow path provided by l

l design modifications that have been made to the Boric Acid System jj (i.e., a second flow path was available by manual initiation through l

valve CV-333 and line 20448).

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l 8206070848 820528 hDRADOCK 03000206 PDR L

R. H. Engelken May 28, 1982 4.

A review of this incident with the operators involved.

There was no adverse impact on public health or safety as a result of this deficiency. Please contact me if additional information concerning this matter is required.

Sincerely,

}&

l flA'ed Enclosure cc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcemert U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control (MIPC)

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

L.F. ililler (USNRC Resident Inspector, San Onofre, Unit 1) t l

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