05000251/FIN-2014005-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Procedure to Realign Steam Supply to the Gland Sealing Steam System |
Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to maintain an adequate procedure for gland sealing steam supply realignment. Specifically, the licensee failed to have initial conditions in place in the procedure that provided specific direction that steam supply to the gland sealing system cannot be transferred from the main steam system to the auxiliary steam system with a unit in Mode 1 or 2. The licensee took corrective action to add initial conditions to procedure 4-GOP-103 that would not allow gland seal system steam supply realignment while in Modes 1 or 2. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) 1967899. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, the failure to have specific guidance in procedure 4-GOP-103 that prevented realigning the gland sealing steam supply while in Mode 1 or 2 resulted in lowering condenser vacuum and a subsequent reactor trip on low condenser vacuum when the gland sealing steam supply was being realigned with Unit 4 in Mode 1. The inspectors screened the finding using Attachment 4 to NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 and determined that the finding was a transient initiator contributor which required evaluation using Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power (July 19, 2012). The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not result in a reactor trip and loss of mitigating equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a safe shutdown condition. The finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area because the licensee failed to ensure an adequate general operating procedure was available to support nuclear safety (H.1). |
Site: | Turkey Point |
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Report | IR 05000251/2014005 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Butcavage A Nielsen A Vargas D Mas-Penaranda J Rivera M Coursey M Endress P Capehart R Pursley S Sandal T Hoeg |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.1, Resources |
INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000251/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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