05000250/FIN-2014005-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Fully Implement Emergency Operating Procedure 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response |
| Description | A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 6.8.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to fully implement procedure 3-EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. Specifically, the licensee failed to take effective action to implement Step 25 of 3-EOP-ES-0.1 and maintain pressurizer pressure and level within their required bands in order to stabilize plant conditions following a loss of instrument air and a reactor plant trip. Corrective actions included training licensed operators on the implementation of EOP-ES- 0.1. The licensee entered this performance deficiency in their corrective action program as action request 1983618. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors screened the issue under the initiating events cornerstone using Attachment 4 (June 19, 2012) and Exhibit 1 (June 19, 2012) of Appendix A to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (June 2, 2011). The inspectors concluded that a detailed risk evaluation would be required by a senior reactor analyst (SRA) because the finding was associated with a transient initiator and operator actions to utilize equipment to mitigate the associated plant transient. The NRC model for Turkey Point was adjusted by setting the failure probability of the power-operated relief valve (PORV) to remain closed during an event equal to 1.0. This represented the impact of failing to follow the emergency operating procedures resulting in lifting the PORVs during the event. The change in core damage frequency results were below the 1E-6 threshold and the issue was thus determined to be of very low risk significance (Green). This finding was associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the training component of the human performance area because the licensee failed to ensure licensed operator training provided knowledge that the reactor coolant pump seals could operate for a short period of time without seal flow (H.9). |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2014005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Butcavage A Nielsen A Vargas D Mas-Penaranda J Rivera M Coursey M Endress P Capehart R Pursley S Sandal T Hoeg |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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