05000456/FIN-2013007-06
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Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of Technical Specification, Section 5.4.1b for the licensees failure to establish the necessary actions as required in Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) 1(2)BwEP ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Revision 201. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure EOPs 1(2)BwEP ES-1.3 contained the necessary actions for transition to 1(2)BwCA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation for a small loss of coolant accident (SLOCA) or medium loss of coolant accident (MLOCA) with a concurrent failure of residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger (HX) to safety injection (SI) and centrifugal charging pump (CCP) isolation valves. The licensee entered this finding into their Correction Action Program to revise the subject procedures. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstones objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure the procedure for establishing containment sump recirculation for a SLOCA or MLOCA contained the necessary actions for potential equipment failures. Since the finding resulted in the potential for a loss of the containment sump recirculation function during a SLOCA or MLOCA for certain equipment failures when transferring to containment sump recirculation, the inspectors determined a Detailed Risk-Evaluation was required. Based on the Detailed Risk-Evaluation, the Senior Reactor Analysts determined the delta core damage frequency for the finding was 1.0E-8/yr. and was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the finding was not representative of current performance. |
Site: | Braidwood ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000456/2013007 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Jose C Tilton D Szwarc J Chiloyan M Munir N Valos W Sherbin |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2013007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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