05000333/FIN-2013004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Reactor Water Recirculation Digital Flow Control Modification Post Maintenance Test Procedure Results in Unexpected Power Increase |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4, Procedures, because Entergy staff did not adequately preplan the implementation of a plant modification to install a digital reactor water recirculation (RWR) flow control system during the 2012 refueling outage. Specifically, post-maintenance testing (PMT) failed to identify that a portion of the runback logic was incorrectly programmed. As a result, the RWR system was restored to operation without identifying the error. On November 8, 2012, during power ascension activities following a subsequent forced outage, the A RWR pump demand signal increased from minimum flow (approximately 30 percent) to approximately 44 percent with no operator action when feedwater flow increased above 20 percent. This resulted in an unexpected power increase of approximately 1.4 percent (37 megawatts thermal (MWth)). As immediate corrective action, control room operators reduced flow in the A RWR loop to restore it to pre-transient conditions, locked the scoop tubes for both RWR motor-generators, and placed the power ascension on hold pending further evaluation of the event. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2012-08042. The issue of inadequate PMT was subsequently entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2013-05326. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to Example 4.b in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that it resulted in a plant transient. In addition, the finding adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 1 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low significance (Green) because the performance deficiency did not cause a reactor trip or the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because FitzPatrick did not ensure that the PMT acceptance criteria specified in the engineering change (EC) package were clearly translated into PMT testing work packages to verify successful implementation of the digital RWR flow control modification. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2013004 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Patel T Burns J Laughlin E Knutson B Sienel A Burritt |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2013Q3
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