05000333/FIN-2012005-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Install Reserve Station Service Transformers in Accordance with Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing, Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4, Procedures, because FitzPatrick personnel did not perform installation of replacement reserve station service transformers (RSSTs) 71T-2 and 71T-3 in accordance with written procedures. Specifically, station personnel did not remove the shorting bars from the current transformer (CT) circuits, as specified by the work instructions, which impacted trip set points for the transformer differential current protection relays. As a result, the 71T-3 differential protection circuitry actuated after the start of a major electrical load when it was not required, which caused a transformer lockout and loss of offsite power. As immediate corrective action, operators reestablished station power from the normal station service transformer via the 345 kilovolt (KV) back feed and secured the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2012-06866. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. Per Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Operational Checklists for both PWRs and BWRs, Checklist 7, BWR Refueling Operation with RCS Level > 23\', the issue constituted a finding because, after the event, FitzPatrick did not have one operable qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystems. Also, per Checklist 7, this was not a finding requiring phase 2 or phase 3 analysis, nor did it constitute a loss of control event per Appendix G, Table 1. Therefore, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources, because Entergy staff did not provide an accurate and up-to-date work package for installation of the RSSTs, in that the package did not include a drawing of the CT shorting terminal configured with the shorting bar removed, nor did they ensure that the work package was appropriately updated with clarifying information after workers questioned the existing instructions. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000333/2012005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Sienel A Burritt R Rolph G Meyer R Barkley S Mccarver E Knutson B Bickett |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2012005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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