05000333/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Submit an LER for a for a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the HPCI System Safety Function |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.73, Licensee Event Report [LER] System, because failure of an isolation valve in the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system torus suction line to fully open on demand caused the automatic suction swap function to be inoperable, but this condition was not reported to the NRC as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(v) within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. Specifically, while this condition existed, an automatic suction swap from the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) to the torus would not have gone to completion, but rather would have stopped with both suction paths open. Depending on whether or not HPCI was running at the time, this would either result in air entrainment in the HPCI pump suction, causing a loss of HPCI, or an increase in suppression pool level due to drainage from the CSTs. However, this condition was not reported to the NRC as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(v) within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-01768. The inspectors determined that the failure to submit an LER within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.73 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects. |
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
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| Report | IR 05000333/2013002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Mccarver J Laughlin E Knutson B Sienel A Burritt E Miller |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.73 |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - FitzPatrick - IR 05000333/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (FitzPatrick) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (FitzPatrick)
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