ML14238A717
| ML14238A717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/2014 |
| From: | Dean E D Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LlC-14-0097 LER 14-005-00 | |
| Download: ML14238A717 (5) | |
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NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME Fort Calhoun Station 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000285 3. PAGE 1 OF 4 4. TITLE Technical Specification Violation of Containment Integrity 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO. MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 6 27 2014 2014 005 - 0 8 25 2014 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 1 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2201(d) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10. POWER LEVEL 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 100 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 73.71(a)(4) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 73.71(a)(5) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT Erick Matzke TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 402-533-6855 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLETO EPIX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-FACTURER REPORTABLE TO EPIX 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On Friday, June 27, 2014, during performance of a valve exercise test it was discovered that test swagelock plug was missing between the containment penetration and the associated outboard isolation valve. Technicians discovered the test swagelock plug resting on a nearby junction box and not in place on the containment penetration. The technicians immediately notified the Auxiliary Building Operator who was assisting with the surveillance test. Operations shift supervision were notified and operations declared containment inoperable per Technical Specification and entered a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> limiting condition for operation (LCO) to restore containment integrity. The shift manager directed the technicians to reinstall the test swagelock plug on the containment penetration. At that point, operations declared containment operable and exited the associated Technical Specification LCO. Maintenance personnel exhibited weak Human Performance tool Independent Verification usage. Station personnel completed the Containment Integrity checklists prior to all containment isolation boundary maintenance and/or LLRTs being completed.
Containment integrity was restored.
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEFort Calhoun Station 05000285 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO. 2 OF 4 2014 -005 -00 NARRATIVE NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) BACKGROUND Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is a two-loop reactor coolant system of Combustion Engineering design.
FCS uses custom Technical Specifications (TSs) which define containment integrity as follows: Containment Integrity Containment integrity is defined to exist when all of the following are met:
(1) All nonautomatic containment isolation valves which are not required to be open during accident conditions and blind flanges, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 2.6(1)a, are closed. (2) The equipment hatch is properly closed and sealed. (3) The personnel air lock satisfies Specification 2.6(1)b. (4) All automatic containment Isolation valves are operable, locked closed, or deactivated and secured in their closed position (or isolated by locked closed valves or blind flanges as permitted by a limiting condition for operation). (5) The uncontrolled containment leakage satisfies Specification 3.5, and (6) The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows or O-rings) is operable. The TS for containment integrity 2.6(1) reads as follows: a. Containment integrity shall not be violated unless the reactor is in a cold or refueling shutdown condition. Without containment integrity, restore containment integrity within one hour or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, in at least subcritical and <300°F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Normally locked or sealed-closed valves (except for PCV-742A/B/C/D) may be opened intermittently under administrative control without constituting a violation of containment integrity. EVENT DESCRIPTION On Friday, June 27, 2014, during performance OP-ST-CCW-3005B "Component Cooling Category A and B Valve Exercise Test (for the C and D valves)" it was discovered that test swagelock plug F1 was found missing between containment penetration M-88 "Containment Purge Inlet (Direct Communicating System)" and PCV-742D "Containment Purge Air Inlet Outboard Isolation Valve." Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians discovered the test swagelock plug resting on a nearby junction box and not in place on the containment penetration. I&C technicians immediately notified the Auxiliary Building Operator (NSOA) who was assisting with the CCW surveillance test. Operations shift supervision were notified and operations declared containment inoperable per Technical Specification 2.6(1)a and entered a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCO to restore NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEFort Calhoun Station 05000285 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO. 3 OF 4 2014 -005 -00 NARRATIVE NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) containment integrity. Additionally, operations entered AOP-12 "Loss of Containment Integrity". The shift manager directed I&C technicians to reinstall the test swagelock plug F1 on containment penetration M-88. At that point, operations declared containment operable and exited the associated Technical Specification 2.6(1)a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCO. Additionally, operations met exit conditions for AOP-12 and exited that procedure. Operations shift supervision directed investigation of other outboard containment penetrations in rooms 81, 69, 59 and 13. This investigation revealed that all containment penetrations were found to be acceptable and no other missing test swagelock plugs were discovered. At that time operations reported no extent of condition existed. Condition Report 2014-07958 documents this issue. This event is reportable as a loss of containment integrity under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). CONCLUSION Maintenance supervision determined that the last time penetration M-88 and its associated test swagelock plug F1 was manipulated was during the most recent local leak rate test (LLRT) for this penetration. Following valve maintenance during an extended shutdown, on 11-22-13 contract I&C personnel performed an "As-Left" containment penetration LLRT using procedure IC-ST-AE-3188, "Type C Local Leakage Rate Test of Penetration M-88." A clearance was hung by operations personnel in support of the LLRT to control penetration dampers PCV-742C, "Containment Purge Air Inlet Inboard Isolation Valve," and PCV-742D. The LLRT test was completed as required and met the leakage criteria. During restoration of the penetration, procedure IC-ST-AE-3188 step 7.4.3 requires I&C technicians to reinstall cap F1 onto fill point and tighten. This step has an independent verification required. Both technicians initialed that the cap was reinstalled and independently verified. A cause analysis determined that:
FCS maintenance personnel exhibited weak Human Performance tool Independent Verification usage.
And FCS personnel completed OI-CO-5, "Containment Integrity," checklists prior to all containment isolation boundary maintenance and/or LLRTs being completed. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The Swagelock cap that was missing has been reinstalled and the system is now fully operable. Investigation into other containment penetrations in rooms 81, 69, 59, and room 13 found no extent of condition. Additional actions will be implemented by the stations corrective action system. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION(02-2014) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGEFort Calhoun Station 05000285 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REV NO. 4 OF 4 2014 -005 -00 NARRATIVE NRC FORM 366 (02-2014) At the time of this event, the unit was at various power levels, but RCS temperature remained> 210°F requiring containment integrity per Technical Specification 2.6.1(a) for 151 days while containment penetration M-88 fill plug cap F-1 was not installed. During this time, PCV-742C and PCV-742D remained locked closed. No pathway ever existed from the containment atmosphere through the inboard isolation valve PCV-7 42C through the open penetration fill plug opening during this time period. SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This does not represent a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI 99-02, revision 7. PREVIOUS EVENTS No incidents of loss of containment integrity due to human error have been documented in the last three years.