LIC-04-0105, LER 04-S01-00 for the Fort Calhoun Station Regarding Inadequate Security Compensatory Measures for a Security Zone

LER 04-S01-00 for the Fort Calhoun Station Regarding Inadequate Security Compensatory Measures for a Security Zone

ML042890273
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	10/14/2004
From:	Bannister D Omaha Public Power District
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LIC-04-0105 LER 04-S01-00
Download: ML042890273 (5)

Text

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-I Omaha Public Power District 444 South 16th Street Mall Omaha NE 68102-2247 October 14, 2004 LIC-04-0 105 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Station P 1- 137 Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2004-SO1 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2004-Sol, Revision 0, dated October 14, 2004. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71(a)(4). If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely, D. J. Bannister Manager - Fort Calhoun Station DJB/EPM/epm Attachment Employment with Equal Opportunity

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COML APPROVED BY OMB. NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours5.787037e-4 days <br />0.0139 hours <br />8.267196e-5 weeks <br />1.9025e-5 months <br />.

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOINPrivacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) to infocollects@nrc gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104)! Ofke of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the (See reverse for required number of information collection digitslcharacters for each block)

'1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1 OF 4

4. TITLE Inadequate Security Compensatory Measures for a Security Zone

5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER REV NO, MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 08 19 2004 2004 - SO1 - 00 10 14 2004 05000

9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFRS: (Check all that apply)

[7 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 17 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(Z)(ii)(A) 0 50,73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 20.2203(a)(I) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(Z)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)@)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(Z)(i) 0 50.36(c)(I )(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50,73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 17 50,36(c)(l)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(Z)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(Z)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) IXI 73.71(a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 20.2203(a)(Z)(v) [7 50.73@)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER 0 20.2203(a)(Z)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Brian Obermeyer (402) 533-6624

- 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU- REPORTABLE TO EPlX CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FFT$;R REPORTABLE TO EPlX r

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMlSSlON DATE) IXI NO DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On Thursday, August 19, 2004, at 1259 hours0.0146 days <br />0.35 hours <br />0.00208 weeks <br />4.790495e-4 months <br />, compensatory measures were incorrectly lifted per the direction of the The execution of a flawed decision and not adhering to procedural requirements is considered the root cause.

As an interim measure, the security force has implemented a process that ensures the CAS and SAS operators, the Sergeant, and the Shift Security Supervisor all concur on compensatory measures. The Security Duty Officer is contacted if there is not a consensus among this group.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station 05000285 . 2 OF 4 2004 - SO1 - 00 The CAS and SAS operators overheard this request. The SAS operator noted at the time of the request the zone was still in alarm. The B shift CAS asked the B shift SAS via intercom for verification on what he heard. SAS stated he was on the phone with the SSS to clarify what he had heard. The NS02 contacted SAS for a time to put in the Security Compensatory Post Log (SDF-104) for removing the post. In the mean time, the SSS called CAS to inform him of the removal. CAS stated that the post could not be removed because two personnel were still in the zone. The SSS stated that a meeting was held in the morning and the post need not be compensated.

At 1259 hours0.0146 days <br />0.35 hours <br />0.00208 weeks <br />4.790495e-4 months <br />, compensatory measures were lifted per the direction of the SSS and logged on the SDF-104. At the time the compensatory measures were lifted, work was still in progress. The decision was still being questioned by both the B shift CAS and SAS operators but the concern was not raised above the SSS level where the decision was made. The alarm stations continued to monitor the zone via CCTV cameras.

At 1500, the C shift CAS operator contacted the C shift Sergeant to express concern that compensatory measures were not in place on the zone. The Sergeant forgot to follow up on the CAS operators concerns.

At 1830 following turnover between the SSS for day and night shift, an operator wanted to go into the zone. The C shift CAS operator (who also was filling in as the B shift CAS at the time of the event) questioned the Sergeant whether they were to continue the practice that had been done during the day. The Sergeant remembered the CAS operators concern from 1500 and directed the CAS operator to contact the oncoming SSS.

The oncoming SSS felt that lifting the measures was contrary to procedure. The SSS made several phone calls to B shift personnel involved in the earlier decision. The Security Duty Officer (SDO), SOS, and Manager - Security Services & EP (MSSEP) were also notified. The event was determined to meet the criteria for a one hour NRC notification per 10 CFR 73.71 at 2125 hours0.0246 days <br />0.59 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.085625e-4 months <br />, based on a decision by the SOS that the event was reportable. The notification to the NRC was made at 2137 hours0.0247 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.131285e-4 months <br />. A search of the plant was done to verify all areas were secure and all security measures were in place.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (1-2001)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station 05000285 3 OF 4 2004 - SO1 - 00 Time Event

-1000 Sergeant determined that posting would be required in the zone due to the work.

1022 NSO 1 posted as a compensatory measure. Initialed SDF-104, compensatory log.

1057 NS02 relieves NSO1, initialed SDF-104.

-1247 NS03 relieves NS02 for a break. did not initial SDF-104.

-1250 NS02 meets SSS by service building; SSS makes decision to pull the compensatory measure.

-1250-1259 NS02 returned and SSS radioed a request to have the compensatory measure pulled.

1259 SAS/CAS both question the pulling of the compensatory measure with personnel still working.

SSS justifies the decision.

I 1259 I ComDensatorv measure Dulled and alarm reset. I

-1300 CAS and SAS relieved 1259-1310 Alarm came back in.

1310 Alarm reset.

1310-1321 Alarm came back in.

1321 Alarm reset.

1321-1548 Alarm came back in.

-1500 CAS and SAS relieved by C Shift, C CAS notified C Sergeant of posting practice but he forgot to pass information on.

1548 Alarm reset. Work complete. Area secured, locking mechanism installed.

-1800 Night shift SSS relieves day shift SSS.

-1830 Plant operations wanted to enter zone, C shift CAS operator questioned Sergeant whether to continue the practice utilized during days

-1830 Sergeant remembered, contacted SSS

+1830 SSS contacted the Security Duty Officer, SOS, Manager-Security Services & EP

-1 900-2 125 Contacted day shift personnel, discussion to determine if criteria met the one hour NRC notification per 10 CFR 73.7 1 2125 Determined one hour report was needed.

2137 One hour report was completed.

I A root cause evaluation was conducted to determine the cause of this event so that appropriate corrective actions could be implemented. The SOS correctly determined that removing debris was going to require a compensatory posting of a security officer at the zone for the duration of the task. The area was properly posted from 1022 to 1259, but at that time it was directed by the SSS to depost the compensatory measure. The debris removal evolution continued into the afternoon with the zone in alarm and several personnel in the area. This resulted in improper compensatory posting of the area and following an investigation required a one hour report to the NRC.

Based on interviews and all available evidence, it appears that the SSS made a flawed decision and directed actions contrary to procedure. The SSS over-ruled the questions brought forth by both the SAS and CAS operators resulting in the area not having appropriate compensatory measures in place and the zone being monitored by the CASISAS operators

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVlSlON NUMBER NUMBER Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station 05000285 4 OF 4 2004 - SO1 - 00 A contributing cause to the event was improper application of self checking and intervention techniques during the questioning process. Questions were asked, but the concerns that remained did not get communicated high enough to be resolved.

A second contributing cause to the event was the lack of twolthree way communications during the phone conversation between the SOS and the SSS which played a contributing factor in the SSS not having complete understanding of the direction given.

A third contributing cause was there were various interpretations of a long standing unwritten practice to allow Operators in a zone for less than 10 minutes without providing compensatory measures. Individuals interviewed had differing viewpoints on when a compensatory measure was needed.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no challenges to nuclear safety during or as a result of this event, and no Technical Specifications were violated. The zone was monitored. An officer was present in the zone for over an hour during the time the zone was improperly compensated. The zone was cleared and the doors accessing the zone were properly secured following maintenance activities in the zone. Therefore, this event has little if any impact on the health and safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

As an interim measure, the security force has implemented a process that ensures the CAS and SAS operators, the Sergeant, and the Shift Security Supervisor all concur on compensatory measures. The Security Duty Officer is contacted if there is not a consensus among this group. A procedure change is being processed to place this change in the appropriate procedures. In addition, Security procedures were changed to require an officer to be present whenever someone needs to enter this security zone. Additional corrective actions will be implemented by the corrective action system.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE:

This event did not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LERs 2003-SO 1 and 2003-SO2 document similar incidents where proper compensation was not made.

IRC FORM 366A (1-2001