05000443/FIN-2013008-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 22:19, 29 May 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Verify Adequate Fault Protection for Safety Related Equipment from NON-SAFETY Related Load Fault |
| Description | The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that, NextEra did not appropriately select and review, for suitability of application, a safety related over-current protection device for a safety related power panel (EDE-PP01B). Specifically, NextEra did not consider the effects of the current-limiter function of safety related inverters, which supplied the safety related power panel and would limit fault current at the over-current protection device. As a result, the safety related over-current protective devices would not have prevented a postulated fault of a non-safety related load, supplied from the safety related power panel, from causing a momentary loss of voltage to the power panel and all associated safety related loads. In response, NextEra entered the issue into their corrective action program and performed a preliminary analysis that determined an existing non-safety related fuse would provide adequate over-current protection. NextEra credited the use of this fuse as an interim compensatory measure in their operability assessment in order to conclude the system was operable. The team determined the analysis and associated assessment were reasonable. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to Example 3.j of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, and was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance because the issue was a design or qualification deficiency that did not result in inoperability of the system. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the underlying cause was not indicative of current performance. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2013008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond K Mangan S Pindale W Sherbin J Schoppy S Kobylarz P Krohn |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2013008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||