05000443/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Evaluate Service Water Cooling Tower Level |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of technical specification (TS) 3.7.4 Service Water System/Ultimate Heat Sink, resulted from operators failure to follow procedures to evaluate a faulty SW cooling tower basin level instrument. Specifically, because NextEra personnel did not properly follow their Conduct of Operations procedure and the Operations Management Manual, an inaccurate level gage was used to determine SW cooling tower basin level. This resulted in the SW cooling tower basin level dropping and remaining below its TS minimum value for approximately 17 days. NextEras immediate corrective actions included conducting a fast fill of the cooling tower basin via the fire protection system to restore operability on December 7, 2012, and entering the issue into their CAP as CR 1830734. Planned corrective actions included implementing a process for operations department oral boards to focus on standards applications, fundamentals, and use of situational questions. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the SW cooling tower basin level was below its TS minimum level of 42.15 feet for 17 days. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations (IMC 0609A). The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency did not affect the design or qualification of the SW system and it did not represent a loss of system safety function. Although the finding did involve the degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic initiating event, the SW cooling tower had sufficient margin available to satisfy its design basis requirements and safety function. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, because NextEra did not use conservative assumptions in decision making and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed, rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, NextEra failed to properly evaluate which SW cooling tower level gage was inoperable and thus relied on an inoperable indication for SW cooling tower level. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2013002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Dentel P Mckenna S Rich B Dionne M Jennerich |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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