IR 05000348/2025004
| ML26026A253 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/2026 |
| From: | Catherine Scott NRC/RGN-II/DORS/PB3 |
| To: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2025004 | |
| Download: ML26026A253 (0) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2025004 AND 05000364/2025004
Dear Jamie Coleman:
On December 31, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant. On January 22, 2026, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Josh Carrol, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
February 3, 2026 Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Christian B. Scott, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 05000348 and 05000364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8 Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: Distribution via GovDelivery
Signed by Scott, Christian on 02/03/26
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Post-Maintenance Test of 1C Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348, 364/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealing Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions,
Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to perform a post-maintenance test (PMT) in accordance with NMP-MA-014-001, Post-Maintenance Testing Guidance. Specifically, following October 2024 maintenance on the 1C emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel system, the PMT did not ensure the diesel could be loaded to 110%, as required by the PMT procedure, to verify EDG operability.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000364/2025-004-00 Unit 2, Manual Reactor Trip due to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum 71153 Closed LER 05000348,05000364/
2025-001-00 Units 1 and 2, Emergency Diesel 1C Unable to Achieve 110% of Maximum Load 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period shut down for a scheduled refueling outage (1R33). On October 26, 2025, the unit started up (i.e., Mode 2) and began increasing power. On October 28, 2025, at approximately 14 percent RTP the reactor was down powered to hot standby (Mode 3) to perform rework of turbine governor valves no. 3 and 4 and to address main condenser vacuum leaks. After repairs, the unit was restarted on October 29, 2025, and returned to rated thermal power (RTP) on November 3, 2025. The unit remained at or near RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near RTP for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 trains 'A' and 'B' of spent fuel pool cooling and purification system on October 7, 2025.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 1 containment (Fire Area 1-055-1-CTMT) on October 15, 2025. (Procedure FNP-2-FPP-3.0)
- (2) Emergency diesel generator building (Fire Areas 057-DGB-2C, 058-DGB-1B, 059-DGB-2B, 059-DGB-2B, 060-DGB-1C, and 061-DGB-1-2A) on December 2, 2025.
(FNP-0-FPP-2.0)
- (3) Units 1 and 2 main control room (Fire Area 044-401) on December 29, 2025.
(FNP-1-FPP-1.0)
- (4) Unit 2 train 'A' safety-related 4160-volt switchgear and load center room (Fire Area 2-041-2335) on December 29, 2025. (FNP-2-FPP-1.0)71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The licensee completed the annual requalification operating examinations required to be administered to all licensed operators in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 55.59(a)(2), "Requalification Requirements," of the NRC's "Operator's Licenses." The inspector performed an in-office review and evaluation of the overall pass/fail results of individual operating examinations and crew simulator operating examinations in accordance with IP 71111.11, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance." These results were compared to the thresholds established in Section 3.03, "Requalification Examination Results," of IP 71111.11.
- (1) The review included licensed operator examination failure rates for the annual requalification operating exam administered on September 18, 2025.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 1 main control room during the following:
- Reactor shutdown activities for refueling outage 1R33 on October 1, 2025.
- Reactor transition (heat up) from safe shutdown (Mode 4) to hot standby (Mode 3)on October 22, 2025.
- Reactor startup from refueling outage 1R33 on October 26, 2025.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room simulator during a complex extended simulator scenario on November 18, 2025.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Replacement of the Unit 2 B steam generator feed pump turbine exhaust breakable diaphragm on April 23, 2025. (Work Order (WO) SNC855371).
- (2) Unit 2 125-volt DC system (direct current) batteries preventive maintenance activities, post-maintenance testing, performance history, and overall equipment health on December 11, 2025 (Condition Report (CR) 11228085).
- (3) Unit 2 spent fuel pool ventilation exhaust radiation monitor preventive maintenance activities, calibration testing, performance history, and overall equipment state on December 16, 2025 (WO SNC1766971).
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) Repair and testing of the Unit 2 service water (SW) pump E replacement motor, performed under WO SNA27007-0288, Revision 4, including review of the following Class 1E nonconformance reports (NCRs):
- NCRs25-522 (I-494),25-527 (I-993), and NCR 25-528 (I-023). Measurement instruments (e.g., dial indicator, pressure gauge) used for Class 1E work found out of calibration.
- NCR 25-531 (JN1712283). Multiple nonconforming conditions on rotor shaft.
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Shared (Units 1 and 2) emergency diesel generator 1C (shared between Units 1 and 2) after a surveillance failure on August 13, 2025. (CR11203401)
- (2) Unit 1 sequencer '1G' performance after it failed to deenergize the '1G' [4.16 kV]
emergency bus (train B) during a simulated loss of offsite power (LOOP) on September 29, 2025. (CR11215761
- (3) Unit 1 containment purge (penetration 12) after failing the local leak rate (10 CFR 50 Appendix J) acceptance criteria on October 18, 2025. (CR11221123)
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage 1R33 activities from October 1, 2025, to October 30, 2025.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 seal injection valve 'B' testing after reassembly on October 14, 2025. (WO SNC2816761)
- (2) Unit 1 main steam isolation valve testing following installation on October 18, 2025.
(FNP-1-STP-45.7)
- (3) Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump testing after reassembly on October 23, 2025. (FNP-1-STP-22.32)
- (4) Unit 1 pressurizer power-operated relief valve testing following reassembly on October 23, 2025. (Procedure FNP-1-STP-45.16)
- (5) Unit 1 main turbine governor valve No. 4 testing following replacement to address installation issues that delayed unit startup on October 29, 2025. (WO SNC1326909)
Containment Isolation Valve (CIV) Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1 containment purge (penetration 12) local leak rate testing on October 18, 2025.
(FNP-1-STP-627.2)
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
- (1) Evaluated an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill for a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) scenario, including emergency action level (EAL) assessment and classification of a General Emergency, on October 18, 2025.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025)71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Fire suppression water system health, including multiple fire main ruptures of buried piping. (Corrective Action Report (CAR) 893128)
71153 - Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000364/2025-004-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip due to Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum, dated August 18, 2025 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML25230A243). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct, and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. This LER is Closed.
- (2) LER 2025-001-00, "Unit 1 and 2, Emergency Diesel 1C Unable to Achieve 110% of Maximum Load," dated October 14, 2025 (ML25287A034). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71153. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Post Maintenance Test of 1C Emergency Diesel Generator Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000348, 364/2025004-01 Open/Closed
[H.5] - Work Management 71153 A self-revealing Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to perform a post-maintenance test (PMT) in accordance with NMP-MA-014-001, Post-Maintenance Testing Guidance. Specifically, following October 2024 maintenance on the 1C emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel system, the PMT did not ensure the diesel could be loaded to 110%, as required by the PMT procedure, to verify EDG operability.
Description:
On August 13, 2025, with Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, the licensee performed Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.12, which demonstrates, in part, that the EDG can operate at 110%
of its continuous rated load for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. During the surveillance, the EDG was unable to reach the 110% load (i.e., 3100-kilowatts) and was subsequently declared inoperable. On October 14, 2025, the licensee submitted Licensee Event Report (LER) 2025-001-00, Emergency Diesel 1 C Unable to Achieve 110% of Maximum Load, (ADAMS Accession No. ML25287A034) because it determined that the diesel had been inoperable for a duration greater than allowed by TS (i.e., 10 days). Specifically, the licensee determined the condition originated during planned October 2024 maintenance when work on the fuel system and fuel control linkage limited fuel-rack travel and prevented the EDG from loading to 110 percent.
The inspectors reviewed the LER, the licensees causal evaluation, maintenance work orders, and PMT procedures. During the 1C EDG outage (October 2024), a vendor performed maintenance to replace a fuel injector pump and adjust fuel-rack positioning. Performance of this work required removal and reinstallation of the fuel control linkage; however, a 110% load run of the engine was not conducted. Procedure NMP-MA-014-001, Post Maintenance Testing Guidance, Rev. 5.10, states that a 110% loaded engine run is required following maintenance that adjusts, replaces, or repairs the EDGs fuel linkage (Attachment 3, Table 3.4 of NMP-MA-014-001). The inspectors determined that during planning and review of the completed maintenance, the licensee failed to identify that a 110% loaded engine PMT was required. The condition was not identified until August 13, 2025, after approximately 10 months, through a routine surveillance that tests EDG loading to 110%.
Corrective Actions: The 1C EDG governor linkage was corrected and the required PMT was completed satisfactorily on August 14, 2025. An extent of condition was performed on other EDGs and determined the same condition did not exist.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report 11203401
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to perform a 110% loaded engine run of the 1C EDG following maintenance involving the fuel control linkage in October 2024, as required by PMT procedure NMP-MA-14-001, was a performance deficiency and was contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency affected the EDGs ability to operate at 110% of its rated load, as required by TS.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors screened the finding as having very low safety significance (Green) because, for Exhibit 2 (Mitigating Systems), all mitigating system screening questions were answered no.
Specifically, the degraded condition did not represent a loss of the PRA function because the 1C EDG supplies non-limiting shutdown loads on the non-accident unit and the EDG could be loaded to at least 100% of its rated load.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. The license did not plan, review, and oversee maintenance activities to ensure the full scope of the work was considered and that the required PMT was correctly identified and implemented.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or procedures.
Licensee procedure, NMP-MA-014-001, Post Maintenance Testing Guidance, Rev. 5.10, established the process for identifying required testing necessary to verify operability of safety-related equipment following maintenance activities. Specifically, Attachment 3, Table 3.4, Diesel Engine Fuel System, of the procedure states, If the fuel control linkage and/or hydraulic governor(s) have been adjusted, repaired and/or replaced, then notify Operations that a 110% loaded engine run is required.
In addition, TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.1 requires, in part, that LCOs shall be met during the Modes in the Applicability section. TS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources, requires, in part, two operable diesel generator sets capable of supplying the onsite Class 1E distribution systems while in Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4.
Contrary to the above, on October 25, 2024, the licensee did not accomplish post maintenance testing of the 1C EDG, an activity affecting quality, as prescribed by documented instructions and procedures. Specifically, the licensee did not perform a 110%
loaded engine run to verify operability of the EDG following maintenance involving the 1C EDG fuel control linkage, in accordance with NMP-MA-014-001. As a result, a maintenance-introduced deficiency was not identified and corrected, resulting in the 1C EDG being inoperable from October 25, 2024, until August 14, 2025, while the plant was in the Modes of applicability. With the 1C EDG inoperable, the licensee failed to meet the LCO in accordance with TS 3.0.1 and 3.8.1 during this period.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On January 22, 2026, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Josh Carrol, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR11243612
Control Room Fire Extinguishers
01/21/26
Fire Plans
FNP-0-FPP-2.0
Protected Area Fire Pre-Plan
4.0
Fire Plans
FNP-1-FPP-1.0
Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Pre-Fire Plan
4.1
Fire Plans
FNP-1-FPP-3.0
Unit 1 Containment Pre-Fire Plan
1.1
Fire Plans
FNP-2-FPP-1.0
Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Pre-Fire Plan
4.1
Procedures
FNP-0-SOP-0.4
Fire Protection Program Administration and FP Impairment
(FPIP) Requirements
2
Procedures
NMP-ES-035-014
Fleet Transient Combustible Controls
8.0