05000412/LER-2006-003, Re Scaffolding Adversely Impacts Main Steam Isolation Valves Closure Capability
| ML063340129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/27/2006 |
| From: | Lash J FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-06-165 LER 06-003-00 | |
| Download: ML063340129 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4122006003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOC FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company James H. Lash 724-682-5234 Site Vice President Fax. 724-643-8069 November 27, 2006 L-06-165 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 License No. NPF-73 LER 2006-003-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 The following Licensee Event Report is submitted:
LER 2006-003-00, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "Scaffolding Adversely Impacts Main Steam Isolation Valves Closure Capability."
James H.
ash Attachment c:
Mr. T. G. Colburn, NRR Senior Project Manager Mr. P. C. Cataldo, NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. S. J. Collins, NRC Region I Administrator INPO Records Center (via electronic image)
Mr. L. E. Ryan (BRP/DEP)
Abstract
At 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br /> on 10/01/06, an Instrumentation and Control (I&C) supervisor noticed that the scaffolding erected near the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 'A' and 'B' Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) could potentially interfere with the closing operation of these MSIVs.
Both MSIVs 'A' and 'B' were declared inoperable at 0835 hours0.00966 days <br />0.232 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.177175e-4 months <br />. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1.5 requires each MSIV to be operable during Modes 1, 2 and 3, and allows one MSIV to be inoperable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> in Mode 1. Since TS 3.7.1.5 does not address two MSIVs being inoperable, TS 3.0.3 was entered which requires the Unit to be placed within Hot Standby (Mode
- 3) within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. By 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br />, the scaffolding that potentially inhibited the 'A' and 'B' MSIV movement had been removed, allowing these two MSIVs to be declared operable and BVPS Unit 2 to exit TS 3.0.3 and 3.7.1.5. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D).
The preliminary root cause of this event has been determined to be Supervisory Methods in that not all responsible supervisors were aware of procedure requirements to perform a joint walkdown of scaffold requests with Operations and a FENOC First Line Supervisor prior to the scaffolding being built. The safety significance of this event was very low.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. The station procedure covering scaffolding erection will be revised to provide a graded classification approach for scaffold walk-downs, to more clearly specify responsibilities, require a higher level of management approval for high risk scaffolds, to provide clear definitions/examples of scaffold risk levels, and to align the scaffold erection procedure with the new risk matrix site procedure, as well as several other enhancements.
- 2. Management will review this event and reinforce scaffolding requirements with the appropriate personnel involved with scaffold erection, which includes applicable personnel from Operations, Maintenance Services, and Construction Services.
- 3. A method will be instituted for Maintenance Services and Construction Services personnel involved with scaffold installation to periodically receive operating experience on scaffolding activities.
- 4. Human performance aspects of this event were reinforced through the actions taken to reset the site human performance clock based upon this event.
Completion of the above and other corrective actions are being tracked through the BVPS corrective action program.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review found one prior BVPS Unit 1 and no prior BVPS Unit 2 Licensee Event Reports within the last five years for an event involving either scaffolding or Main Steam Isolation Valve abnormal operation.
BVPS Unit 1 LER 2003-001, "Safety Injection and Reactor Trip Due to Inadvertent Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure." This event involved a worker causing a Main Steam Isolation Valve to inadvertently close during power operation during the erection of a nearby scaffold.
COMMITMENTS
There are no new commitments made by FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for BVPS Unit 2 in this document.
NOP-LP-4007 NRC Correspondence Review and Approval Process, Rev. 0 CORRESPONDENCE SUBMITTAL CONCURRENCEISIGN-OFF SHEET (1) LETTER NUMBER:
(2) LETTER SUBJECT:
L-06-165 BVPS Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2006-003, "Scaffolding Adversely Impacts Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Capability" (3) PREPARED BY:
(4) DATE RESPONSE DUE TO THE NRC:
R. W. Fedin ext. 4221 November 30, 2006 D N/A (5) POSTING REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 19.11 (6) COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN LETTER?
EZ Yes 0 No ED Yes 0 No If Yes, see commitment summary included with letter (7) NOTARY REQUIRED (or affirmation contained in letter)
(8) CR ASSOCIATED WITH LETTER?
Rl Yes E No [Yes M No If Yes, CR Number:
06-07046 (9) TECHNICAL REVIEW
- Comments (Print Name and Section)
Date No Included Signature Reviewed Comments Below Preparer, Regulatory Affairs
/
I R. W. Fedin A/
74/r-o17 6 IN Peer Review J. E. Mauck j
o~E Support Department Review Root Cause Lead: Greg Davie 1(2" 06 I
El Support Department Review (If applicable)
CR Owner: R. Brosi, Manager, Site Projects Supervisor, Regulatory Affairs B. F. Sepelak
///o Section Manager / Department DirectorEl L. R. Freeland 1i(2-7/06 Department Director
/)
R. G. Mende El CE)
E]
El If Required:
Z PORC Meeting No.
BV-PORC 06-23, dated 11/17/2006 F] CNRB Meeting Date N/A (10) REMARKS / COMMENTS: (If additional space needed, attach page(s) to form.)
Ct m1f1-+ C~tjM,-
MOVf 60~
- Signatures indicate that the submittal was reviewed for accuracy and completeness, and that no significant information has been excluded from the submittal, such that, due to its absence, the reader would be misled.
- Additional signatures may not be required from the Section/Department if responses are provided in writing and are signed by the Section/Department managers for providing input into the submittal. These documents should accompany the submittal when routing for final approvals.