05000285/LER-2009-005, From Fort Calhoun Station Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Train Due to an Inoperable Injection Valve
| ML100540116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 02/10/2010 |
| From: | Reinhart J Omaha Public Power District |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LIC-10-0008 LER 09-005-00 | |
| Download: ML100540116 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2852009005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station 9610 Power Lane Blair, NE 68008 LIC-10-0008 February 10, 2010 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2009-005 Revision 0 for the Fort Calhoun Station Please find attached Licensee Event Report 2009-005, Revision 0, dated February 10, 2010. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). There are no commitments contained in this submittal.
A revision to this LER will be submitted following completion and approval of the root cause analysis.
If you should have any questions, please contact me.
JAR / epmr Attachment c:
E. E. Collins, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV L. E. Wilkins, NRC Senior Project Manager J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector INPO Records Center
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17 Employment with Equal Opportunity 4171
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010 (9-2007)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Fort Calhoun Station 05000285 1
OF 4
- 4. TITLE Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Train Due to an Inoperable Injection Valve
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTI FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR AL REV MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO 05000 FACILITY NAME 05000 11 6
2009 2009
- - 005-00 2
10 2010
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b)
[o 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
Ei 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) o 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 5 o
20.2201(d)
Et 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
Ei 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
Ei 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o]
20.2203(a)(1)
Ei 20.2203(a)(4)
[i 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) o 20.2203(a)(2)(i) o 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
E]
50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL Ei 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) ci 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
Ei 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) oi 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) o 50.36(c)(2)
.]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
Ei 73.71 (a)(4) 0 E
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
Ei 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) o 73.71 (a)(5)
O]
20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) c]
50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
C]
OTHER o]
20.2203(a)(2)(yi)
X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
Ei 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On November 1, 2009, FCS began a refueling outage. The station entered mode 5 (less than 210 degrees F, refueling) on November 2, 2009. On November 6, 2009, during performance of air operated valve diagnostic testing of HCV-1 107A, the air regulator setting was found to be 23.6 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). The regulator pressure setting of 23.6 psig is contrary to the required nominal setting of 35 psig credited in calculation FC06904, "Category I Air-Operated Valve (AOV) Operator Margin Analysis." (HCV-1 107A is an air-to-close valve.) A root cause analysis was initiated to determine the cause of the apparent failure of the valve. By December 12, 2009, the causal analysis had progressed to the point where it was concluded that the valve's regulator had been inadvertently set to the wrong pressure setting during a previous refueling outage.
HCV-1 107A has a safety-related function to shut to isolate AFW flow to a SG as well as to open to allow AFW flow to a SG. With the valve regulator set to 23.6 psig, HCV-1 107A was unable to perform its design safety function for longer than the TS allowed outage time.
Based on the root cause analysis, the date of discovery for this report was determined to be December 12, 2009, instead of the date of the test on November 6, 2009. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
CONCLUSION In the fall of 2006 FCS conducted a SG replacement refueling outage. On September 11, 2006, work order (WO) 218003/01 paperwork was issued out to remove and install the valve operator for HCV-1 107A per the applicable portions of procedure PE-RR-VX-0414S, "Inspection and Repair of Safety Related Fisher 'HSC' Valves." An "As Found" flowscan of HCV-1107A was performed on September 11, 2006. This identified that the input pressure was adjusted slightly greater than 35 psig. The stem coupling and regulator from HCV-1 107A were removed on September 12, 2006, for storage. An as found diagnostic test (Flowscan) was performed on HCV-1 107A and its actuator. (Flowscan is a diagnostic device and methodology used to perform baseline or diagnostic testing on AOV and their actuators.) When HCV-1 107A was reinstalled, the "As Left" Flowscan dated October 27, 2006, identified that the input pressure to the flow scanner was adjusted to slightly greater than 23 psig.
In the period of time between the flowscan of September 11, 2006, and the flowscan of October 27, 2006, the air regulator for HCV-1 107A setting was reset to 23.6 psig instead of 35 psig as specified. There is no record of any activity during those dates that would have changed the regulator setting from the required 35 psig to 23.6 psig.
The plant records do not show any maintenance on the regulator for IA-HCV-I 107A prior to September 11, 2006, or after November 2, 2006.
The as-left setting of the air regulator for HCV-1 107A at 23.6 psig went undetected by station personnel until the performance of AOV diagnostic testing of HCV-1 107A on November 6, 2009. The regulator pressure setting of 23.6 psig is contrary to the required nominal setting of 35 psig credited in calculation FC06904, "Category 1 Air-operated Valve (AOV) Operator Margin Analysis." This LER will be updated upon completion of the root cause analysis (RCA).
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The RCA is not complete. A supplement to this LER will be made based on the results of the RCA.
As part of the WO's detailed work instructions, the air regulator for HCV-1 107A has been reset from 23.6 psig to 35 psig. Additional corrective actions will be controlled by the corrective action system.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The safety significance of this event will be assessed in detail on completion of the root cause analysis.
SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE This event does not result in a safety system functional failure in accordance with NEI-99-02.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
NoneNRC FORM 366A (9-2007)
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