05000443/LER-2012-001, Regarding Inadequate Testing of Certain Emergency Feedwater Actuation System Relays
| ML12262A512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/2012 |
| From: | Walsh K NextEra Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SBK-L-12188 LER 12-001-00 | |
| Download: ML12262A512 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4432012001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
NEXTera EN ERG'Y-,
SEABROK September 13, 2012 10 CFR 50.73 Docket No. 50-443 SBK-L-12188 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Seabrook Station Licensee Event Report (LER) 2012-001-00 Inadequate Testing of Certain Emergency Feedwater Actuation System Relays Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2012-001-00. This LER reports an event that was discovered at Seabrook Station on July 18, 2012. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).
Should you require further information regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Michael O'Keefe, Licensing Manager, at (603) 773-7745.
Sincerely, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Kevin T. Walsh Site Vice President cc:
NRC Region I Administrator J. G. Lamb, NRC Project Manager NRC Senior Resident Inspector NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, P.O. Box 300, Lafayette Road, Seabrook, NH 03874
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 (10"2010)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resourse@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
_ required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Seabrook Station 05000443 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE Inadequate Testing of Certain Emergency Feedwater Actuation System Relays
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 18 2012 2012 -
001 -
00 09 13 2012
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1E 20.2201(d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
El 20.2203(a)(1)
El 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
[I 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.36(c)(2)
[E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
[E 73.71(a)(4) 85%
El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
El 73.71(a)(5)
[] 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
E3 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in response time segment included SSPS relays K515 and K640 as well as the SSPS input relays and SSPS logic. The 76 millisecond response time is well within the 18 second margin to the response time limit.'-
Although relays K515 and K640 have not been explicitly response time tested at the required surveillance frequency, they are periodically tested by a series of overlapping operational tests that confirm proper operation. Master relay K515 is actuated as part of the SSPS logic test. This test also verifies coil integrity for slave relay K640 by passing a small current through the slave relay coil when the master relay contact is closed. The function of slave relay K640 is validated by a periodic Go Test, which energizes the relay coil, closes relay contacts, and actuates the circuit breaker for FW-P-37-B. The ability of the master relay contact to carry sufficient current to actuate slave relay K640 was verified during initial plant startup testing.
This event is of regulatory significance because it met the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the TS. However, this event had no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the plant and its personnel. Although the FW-P-37-B starting and loading response time for a low-low steam generator level condition has not been adequately tested in accordance with the TS, an evaluation concluded that the low-low SG level actuation circuitry remains capable of starting and loading the EFW pump within the required response time. No plant transients, systems actuations, or consequences resulted from this event. This event did not involve a safety system functional failure.
Corrective Actions
The corrective actions include development of procedures to verify response time for actuation of the motor-driven EFW pump following a low-low-SG water level and measurement of the response time. Response time measurements are obtained with the plant shutdown during testing that initiates engineered safety features (ESF) actuation signals and actuates ESF equipment. Based on the plant conditions required for testing, verification of the response times will occur during the refueling outage in the fall of 2012. An additional extent of condition review is being performed to verify the adequacy of Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and Reactor Trip System surveillance procedures.
Similar Events
In March of 2011, Seabrook personnel identified that feedwater isolation on hi-hi steam generator level was not being adequately tested as required by TS 4.3.2.2, which resulted in declaration of a missed surveillance.
Additional Information
The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are included in this LER in the following format: [EIIS system identifier, EIIS component identifier].