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- - Ted C. F:', 'r -.
Senior Vice President ond.
' Chief Operating Officer o
i' NYN 90034 February 8, 1990
. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- - Washington, DC 20555 t'
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' Attention:' Document Control Desk
Reference:
Facility, Operating License No. NPF-67 Docket No; 50-443 Subjects'LLicensee Event Report (LER) No. 90-001-00: Noncompliance with Technical' Specifications - Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperable Gentlemen:
Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (15R) No. 90-001-00 for Seabrook Station.
This submittal documents an event which was. identified on January 9, 1990, and is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1).'
'Should you require further information regarding this matter, please
- - contact Mr. Richard R. Belanger at (603) 474-9521, extension 4048.
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Very truly yours.
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Ted C. Feigenba Enclosures NRC Forms 366,' 366A cci Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Region I
'475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. Noel Dudley NRC Senior Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1149 Seabrook. NH 03874 INPO
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APPROVE) OMS 9#0. 31e60104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
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F ACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMOtR (21 PAGE i33 J
Seabrook Station o j 6 l o t o I o l 4l413 1 lOFl0 l3 TITLt ten Noncompliance with Technical Specifications-Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperable EVENT DATE (51 LER NUnseER ($1 REPORT DATE (7)
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ABSTRACT IUm/t to f 400 speces. Le., approusnerely fureen papie spece synewmven enest (161 On January 9.-1990, at 9:00am EST, while in Mode 5, during routine weekly sampling activities, the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) Icw range pump L
was found to be inoperable.
Investigation into the pump failure identified I
purge air flowing through the sample lines, resulting in non-representative samples being obtained, contrary to Technical Specification 3.3.3.10.
The purge air flowing through the sample lines was due to the regulator isolation valves which provide purge air for cleaning purposes being left in the open position during the restoration of a tagging order, 1
l The mispositioning of these valves on the purge air line to the WRGM l
sample conditioning skid was attributed to the inability to accurately l
determine the required position of the purge air line valves.
1 There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.
For corrective action, the Operations Department will develop a method to determine required positions of equipment when not identified on P& ids or in procedure line ups, for tagging order restorations.
The valves involved will be controlled by an Operations procedure.
This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station, g,,.,m 3
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NAC Pee 2 356A y 8 ICUCLSA3 ESTULATFAY COMMIS$ ION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Amovto oue =o sino-om ExPints: t/31/st FACILeiv hAuttu Dock t? NUMSLR (2) -
LER NUMOIR (Si 9&QS (3)
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] l0 0l2 OF 0 l3 79(T M ausse ausse a seeiset asar esmosant ##C #ss"i Judil(th On January 9, 1990, at 9:00 EST, during routine weekly sampling activities, the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) low range pump was found to be inoperable.
Investigation into the pump failure identified purge air flowing through the sample lines, resulting in non-representative samples being obtained, contrary to. Technical Specification 3.3.3.10.
Background
On December 26, 1989, the Wide Range Gas Monitor sample conditioning skid RM-SKD-53-1 was removed from service for~the purpose of installing a minor modification.
Both the isolation and the restoration of the skid once the modification was complete, were performed using a tagging order.
During restoration of this tagging order on January 5, 1990, regulator isolation valves 1-PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-1 and 1 PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-2 were opened and left in the open position.
These valves provided purge air to the WRGM sample conditioning skid RM-SKD-53-1 for the purposes of cleaning sample lines and nozzles.
l The opening of the purge air line to the sample conditioning skid provided constant flow through the skid. At some time prier to identification of this event the low range, high flow pump tripped due to a diaphragm failure.
Since the purge air line was open, this condition prevented the initiation of the low flow alarm.
The receipt of this alarm would have initiated the action required pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.10.
~ Root Cause The mispositioning of the regulator isolation valves on the purge air line to the WRGM sample conditioning skid was attributed to the inability to accurately deterndne_ the required position of the purge air line valves.
Two purge air lines are associated with the WRGM sampling l
configuration. One line supplies purge air to the sample detection skid, RM-SKD-53-2, and the other to the sample conditioning skid RM-SKD-53-1.
The purge air valves, 1-PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-1 and 1-PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-2, that were left in the open position, are typically not shown on P&ID's sinco l
these valves are instrument valves used only for maintenance isolation.
Additionally, this type of valve is not included in valve lineups of operating procedures.
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seRC Pete 306A U $ NUCLEMt Et!ULATORY COMMIS$10N LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION Areaovto cus ao a:so-om EXPIRES. 8/11/5 9 ACILily hAast til Docati NUMet R 131 4th NUMetR 141 PAot (31 n**
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Seabrook Station o ls lo j o j o l 4l4 l3 9l 0 -0l011 010 0 l3 0F 0 l3 ttxt n 4 =
- - w==c w ass vim When the operator attempted to complete the restoration per the tagging i
order,~he discovered that he could not determine the required position of these-valves.
The operator initially contacted chemistry technicians, but they indicated they could not provide the requested information. Subsequently, the I&C technician familiar with the WRGH war contacted. After obtaining an "information only" copy of the P&ID, he informed the operator that he could not locate the valves but did locate a line leading into the sample detector skid labelled ' purge air".
Further discussion between the operator and technician led to a determina-tion that the valves probably were on the line labelled " purge air", and that the required position was open.
Subsequently, on January 5, 1990, all four instrument air purge isolation valves were placed in the open position, and the WRGM was declared s
operable.
The root cause of this event is the improper determination of required positions of equipment when not identified on P& ids or in procedure lineupt:.
Safety Consecuences l
There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event.
The Wide Range Gas Monitor does not perform any safety functions and the event did not interfere or inhibit any safety related equipment from performing its function.
In addition, the plant continuous air monitors were reviewed to insure that no abnormal radiological conditions existed during this period and the health and safety of employees or the public was not adversely affected by this event.
Corrective Actions
A field walkdown of all radiation monitoring skids was conducted.
l.
'This configuration was determined to be unique to the WRGM Radiation l
Monitoring Skid.
l The Operations department will develop a method to determine required positions of equipment when not identified on P& ids or in procedure lineups, for tagging order restorations.
This will be completed by May 1, 1990. -The valves involved, 1-PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-1 AND 1-PAH-RM-SKD-53-1-V4-2, will be controlled by procedure OS1090.05
- Component Configuration Control".
Plant Conditions
1 At the time of this event the plant was in Mode 5.
This is the first event of this type at Seabrook Station.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000443/LER-1990-001, :on 900109,wide Range Gas Monitor Low Range Pump Found to Be Inoperable,Resulting in Noncompliance W/ Tech Specs.Caused by Regulator Isolation Valves Being Left in Open Position.Walkdown of Skids Conducted |
- on 900109,wide Range Gas Monitor Low Range Pump Found to Be Inoperable,Resulting in Noncompliance W/ Tech Specs.Caused by Regulator Isolation Valves Being Left in Open Position.Walkdown of Skids Conducted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-002, :on 900109,discovered That Auxiliary Sample Pump Used to Satisfy Action Requirements of Tech Spec Was Not Operating.Caused by Dislodged Power Fuse.Pump Relocated & Caution Tape Installed to Protect Pump |
- on 900109,discovered That Auxiliary Sample Pump Used to Satisfy Action Requirements of Tech Spec Was Not Operating.Caused by Dislodged Power Fuse.Pump Relocated & Caution Tape Installed to Protect Pump
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-003, :on 900116,wide-range Gas Monitor Low Range Pump Found Inoperable.Caused by Failed Pump Diaphragm Weakened by High Flow Condition.Ruptured Pump Diaphragm Replaced & Pump Returned to Normal Operations |
- on 900116,wide-range Gas Monitor Low Range Pump Found Inoperable.Caused by Failed Pump Diaphragm Weakened by High Flow Condition.Ruptured Pump Diaphragm Replaced & Pump Returned to Normal Operations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-004, Forwards Util Commitment to Perform Visual Insp of Four Feedwater Sys Check Valves Dash Plate Capscrews During First Refueling Outage,Per LER 90-004-00 | Forwards Util Commitment to Perform Visual Insp of Four Feedwater Sys Check Valves Dash Plate Capscrews During First Refueling Outage,Per LER 90-004-00 | | | 05000443/LER-1990-005, :on 900203,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Failed Radiation Monitor Due to Mechanical Binding of Check Source. Monitor Returned to Operable Status |
- on 900203,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Failed Radiation Monitor Due to Mechanical Binding of Check Source. Monitor Returned to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-006, :on 900206,Train a Radiation Monitor Went Into High Alarm Condition,Resulting in Actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem.Caused by Mechanical Binding.Detector Tube Remounted |
- on 900206,Train a Radiation Monitor Went Into High Alarm Condition,Resulting in Actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem.Caused by Mechanical Binding.Detector Tube Remounted
| | | 05000443/LER-1990-007, :on 900208,when Source Check Removed from Control room,RM-6506B Entered High Alarm Condition,Causing ESF Actuation of Emergency Air Cleanup Sys.Caused by Mechanical Binding.Check Source Replaced |
- on 900208,when Source Check Removed from Control room,RM-6506B Entered High Alarm Condition,Causing ESF Actuation of Emergency Air Cleanup Sys.Caused by Mechanical Binding.Check Source Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-008, :on 900209,latching Mechanism for Door Entering Containment Encl Bldg Failed,Rendering Emergency Air Cleanup Sys Inoperable.Plant Cooldown Initiated,Latching Mechanism Repaired & Door Returned to Svc |
- on 900209,latching Mechanism for Door Entering Containment Encl Bldg Failed,Rendering Emergency Air Cleanup Sys Inoperable.Plant Cooldown Initiated,Latching Mechanism Repaired & Door Returned to Svc
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-009, :on 900213,seal Leak Test Surveillance Not Performed.Caused by Onshift Operator Not Aware Leak Test Required Following Opening of Air Lock.Equipment Hatch Air Lock Tested Satisfactory |
- on 900213,seal Leak Test Surveillance Not Performed.Caused by Onshift Operator Not Aware Leak Test Required Following Opening of Air Lock.Equipment Hatch Air Lock Tested Satisfactory
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-010, :on 900305,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Moisture in Detector Housing.Air Intake Monitors Cleaned & Desiccant Placed in Housing |
- on 900305,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Moisture in Detector Housing.Air Intake Monitors Cleaned & Desiccant Placed in Housing
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-011, :on 900306,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Failure of Geiger-Muller Tube.Monitor Removed from Svc & Tube Replaced |
- on 900306,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred.Caused by Failure of Geiger-Muller Tube.Monitor Removed from Svc & Tube Replaced
| | | 05000443/LER-1990-012, :on 900402,transmitter Failed to Provide Pressure to Reactor Protection Sys Due to Closed Isolation Valve.Caused by Failure to Identify Valve in Procedures. Valves Manipulated to Correct Positions |
- on 900402,transmitter Failed to Provide Pressure to Reactor Protection Sys Due to Closed Isolation Valve.Caused by Failure to Identify Valve in Procedures. Valves Manipulated to Correct Positions
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-013, :on 900419,discovered That Containment Personnel Hatch Unsecured for Approx 28 H.Caused by Installation of Locking Plate Upside Down & Placing Lock Through Only 1 Eyelet.Instructions Posted |
- on 900419,discovered That Containment Personnel Hatch Unsecured for Approx 28 H.Caused by Installation of Locking Plate Upside Down & Placing Lock Through Only 1 Eyelet.Instructions Posted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-014, :on 900612,discovered That Sample Pump for Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank Drain Radiation Monitor Not Running.Caused by Suspended Solids in Steam Generator Blowdown Sys.Solids Cleared from Flow Switch |
- on 900612,discovered That Sample Pump for Steam Generator Blowdown Flash Tank Drain Radiation Monitor Not Running.Caused by Suspended Solids in Steam Generator Blowdown Sys.Solids Cleared from Flow Switch
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-015, :on 900620,turbine Trip W/Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Ground Fault Relay Actuation |
- on 900620,turbine Trip W/Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Ground Fault Relay Actuation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000443/LER-1990-016, :on 900624,ESF Actuation Occurred Resulting in Containment Ventilation Isolation.Caused by Personnel Error. More Descriptive Labels on Inverters & Power Panels & One Line Drawings to Be Placed on Inverters |
- on 900624,ESF Actuation Occurred Resulting in Containment Ventilation Isolation.Caused by Personnel Error. More Descriptive Labels on Inverters & Power Panels & One Line Drawings to Be Placed on Inverters
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-017, :on 900630,discovered That Requirements of Tech Spec 6.11, High Radiation Area, Not Met.Caused by Personnel Error.Operator Counseled Re Consequences of Event & Need for Increased Attention to Detail |
- on 900630,discovered That Requirements of Tech Spec 6.11, High Radiation Area, Not Met.Caused by Personnel Error.Operator Counseled Re Consequences of Event & Need for Increased Attention to Detail
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-018, :on 900705,reactor Trip W/Turbine Trip Occurred.Caused by Contact Closure of Electrohydraulic Control Oil Pressure Switches Satisfying Two Out of Three Logic.Pressure Switches Relocated |
- on 900705,reactor Trip W/Turbine Trip Occurred.Caused by Contact Closure of Electrohydraulic Control Oil Pressure Switches Satisfying Two Out of Three Logic.Pressure Switches Relocated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-019, :on 900721,discovered That Time Limitation of Tech Spec 3.8.4.1 Exceeded by Nearly 7 H.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedures.Root Cause Analysis & Enhancement Sys Evaluation Initiated |
- on 900721,discovered That Time Limitation of Tech Spec 3.8.4.1 Exceeded by Nearly 7 H.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Procedures.Root Cause Analysis & Enhancement Sys Evaluation Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000443/LER-1990-020, :on 900801,door Leading to High Radiation Area Discovered Unsecured.Caused by Personnel Error Involving Lack of Attention to Detail.Intrusion Alarm Switch,Door Latch & Closure Mechanism Adjusted |
- on 900801,door Leading to High Radiation Area Discovered Unsecured.Caused by Personnel Error Involving Lack of Attention to Detail.Intrusion Alarm Switch,Door Latch & Closure Mechanism Adjusted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-021, :on 900801,discovered That Group a Pressurizer Backup Heaters Could Not Be Manually Energized from Main Control Board.Caused by Incorrect Cable Termination Diagram. Design Change to Correct Diagram Initiated |
- on 900801,discovered That Group a Pressurizer Backup Heaters Could Not Be Manually Energized from Main Control Board.Caused by Incorrect Cable Termination Diagram. Design Change to Correct Diagram Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000443/LER-1990-022, :on 900822,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Voltage on Electrohydraulic 24-volt Dc Bus.Cause Not Determined.Electrohydraulic Control Maint Activity Will Be Reviewed on Case by Case Basis Prior to Work |
- on 900822,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Loss of Voltage on Electrohydraulic 24-volt Dc Bus.Cause Not Determined.Electrohydraulic Control Maint Activity Will Be Reviewed on Case by Case Basis Prior to Work
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-023, :on 900927,noncompliance W/Tech Spec Occurred in Unsecured High Radiation Area |
- on 900927,noncompliance W/Tech Spec Occurred in Unsecured High Radiation Area
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000443/LER-1990-024, :on 901102,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred |
- on 901102,actuation of Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup & Filtration Subsystem Occurred
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-025, :on 901109,reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator low-low Level Signal Occurred |
- on 901109,reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator low-low Level Signal Occurred
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000443/LER-1990-026, :on 901116,ESF Actuation Occurred,Causing Control Room Normal Makeup Air Control Subsystem to Transfer to Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Sys.Caused by Personnel Error.Technician Counseled |
- on 901116,ESF Actuation Occurred,Causing Control Room Normal Makeup Air Control Subsystem to Transfer to Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup Sys.Caused by Personnel Error.Technician Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(c)(2)(iv) |
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