05000333/LER-1979-056-01, /01X-1:on 790926,cabling Associated W/Hpci Sys Inboard Steam Supply Isolation Valve & Automatic Depressurization Sys (ADS) Did Not Meet NRC Separation Criteria.Caused by Proximity of HPCI & ADS Cables

/01X-1:on 790926,cabling Associated W/Hpci Sys Inboard Steam Supply Isolation Valve & Automatic Depressurization Sys (ADS) Did Not Meet NRC Separation Criteria.Caused by Proximity of HPCI & ADS Cables

ML19210D675
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	11/20/1979
From:	W. Verne Childs POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19210D659	List: 05000333/LER-1979-056, Forwards LER 79-056/01X-1 05000333/LER-1979-056-01, /01X-1:on 790926,cabling Associated W/Hpci Sys Inboard Steam Supply Isolation Valve & Automatic Depressurization Sys (ADS) Did Not Meet NRC Separation Criteria.Caused by Proximity of HPCI & ADS Cables
References
LER-79-056-01X, LER-79-56-1X, NUDOCS 7911270445
Download: ML19210D675 (2)

LER-1979-056, /01X-1:on 790926,cabling Associated W/Hpci Sys Inboard Steam Supply Isolation Valve & Automatic Depressurization Sys (ADS) Did Not Meet NRC Separation Criteria.Caused by Proximity of HPCI & ADS Cables

Event date:
Report date:
3331979056R01 - NRC Website

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR 00WER PLANT u

DOCKET N0. 50-333 ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-056/01X-1 Page 1 of 1 During normal operation, the plant staff was informed by the Architect-Engineer that certain cabling associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inboard steam supply isolation valve and the Auto-matic Depressurization System (ADS) did not meet the separation criteria required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

This discovery was made as a result of the Fire Hazard Analyses being conducted by the Architect-Engineer.

The six,(6) caQles in question which could affect the control of the inboard isolation valve for the HPCI System steam supply (23-MOV-15) are located in the same cable tray as some ADS cables.

Discovery of this condition is considered a reportable event under the circumstances described in Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 6.9.A.4.1.

The only manner in which improper operation or an undesired situation could result is an event which could cause simultaneous failure of both ADS and HPCI cables to the extent that both systems would be inoperable.

Initial corrective action (taken on September 26,1979) to preclude spuridus closure of 23-MOV-15, de-energized the vahe by racking out of the breaker.

In addition, to satisfy the requirements of primary con-tainment isolation, the outside isolation valve for the HPCI system (23-M0V-16) was maintained. in its normal closed position and checked daily as required by Technical Specifications Appendix A, Paragraph 3.7.1.

In addition, the Architect-Engineer informed the plant that other (third party) cables could affect the operation of 23-MOV-15 due to their proximity to both HPCI and ADS cables.

There are two alternate solutions to correct both cf the problems set forth above. One solution is to re-route the cables while the second solution is to install a redundant ADS control system. As a result of a detailed review of the alternatives, the cable re-routing option was selected and a preliminary design modification to re-route the cables of concern was completed during the week of November 12, 1979.

Further, the plant staff has also re-evaluated the initial corrective action takpn.

This re-evaluation indicated the preferred method of assuring operability of the systems ECCS and primary containment isolation functions would be to pro, vide augmented protection against a fire which might involve cables of both the s9 stems. Accordingly, the FitzPatrick Plant Staff initiated, on November 16, 1979, an hourly patrolling fire watch in those areas in which cabling for the HPCI and ADS are in proximity to each other and restored 23-MOV-15 to a fully operable condition.

This action of establishing an hourly patrolling fire watch parallels that required by Technical Specifications, Appendix A, Paragraph 3.12.E.1.b. when early warning protection against a potential fire must be taken due to inadequate or inoperable fixed detection systems.

With respect to the proposed design modification which will re-route certain cables associated with the HPCI system to provide diverse physical separation, the FitzPatrick Plant anticipates that implementation of the modifications will be completed as originally stated, during the forthcoming refueling outage.

In view of the actions noted above, the event does not represent a significant hazard to the public health and safety.

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