05000285/LER-1980-006-01, /01T-0:on 800415,as Required by IE Bulletin 79-01B,util Has Been Obtaining & Reviewing Test Data on Electrical Equipment.Samples Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Steam & Moisture in Environ

/01T-0:on 800415,as Required by IE Bulletin 79-01B,util Has Been Obtaining & Reviewing Test Data on Electrical Equipment.Samples Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Steam & Moisture in Environ

ML19312D892
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/28/1980
From:	Mahoffey R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML19312D889	List: 05000285/LER-1980-006, Forwards LER 80-006/01T-0 05000285/LER-1980-006-01, /01T-0:on 800415,as Required by IE Bulletin 79-01B,util Has Been Obtaining & Reviewing Test Data on Electrical Equipment.Samples Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Steam & Moisture in Environ
References
IEB-79-01B, IEB-79-1B, LER-80-006-01T, LER-80-6-1T, NUDOCS 8005050326
Download: ML19312D892 (4)

LER-1980-006, /01T-0:on 800415,as Required by IE Bulletin 79-01B,util Has Been Obtaining & Reviewing Test Data on Electrical Equipment.Samples Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Steam & Moisture in Environ

Event date:
Report date:
2851980006R01 - NRC Website

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60 61 OOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT CATE 74 75 REPORT CATE 30 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h l o 121 l As directed by IE Bulletin 79-013 the transmitter lead splices on HPSI Loco Flow l

io Ial l Transmitters, the Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters and the Steam Generator Pressure l

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NAME OF PREPARER R. F. Mehaffev PHONE:

Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285 LER No.80-006

Safety Analysis

As required by IE Bulletin 79-01B, the District has been obtaining and reviewing test data on electrical equipment installed at the Fort Calhoun Station.

During the initial stages of the investigation the only report which was available to the District was a Fisher Laboratory Report 79-6

1. 4 in which the reported splices were tested as part of a " Fail Safe" This test was conducted to insure that a valve actuator system test.

(pneumatic actuator regulator, solenoid valve, and limit switch) would 1

i assume and maintain its accident position.

This accident position and the " Fail Safe" position are the same position.

This reported splice i

was used on the solenoid valve. Even though it was not required in the

~

electrically de-energized " Fail Safe" mode, it was demonstrated that the solenoid remained operable and the splice maintained adequate electrical characteristics.

As part of the expanded review required by IE Bulletin 79-01B, a more detailed review of interfaces was conducted.

In an attempt to locate more information on splices, Commonwealth Electric Company (Fort Calhoun Station electrical contractor) wcs contacted which in turn led to a requast to the Franklin Institute for any testing on Fort Calhoun Station equipment.

Subsequently test report F-C3279 was obtained the second week of April 1980.

The Franklin Institute Test exposed the splices which consist of a single layer of American Pamcor, Inc. heat shrink tubing over an amp-so11 strand butt splice directly to the LOCA environment. Under these condition 9severalofthesamplesfailedtomeet the acceptanca criteria j

of 1 x 10 oh=s/ft. and some of the failures were a complete short circuit (0 "meggar" indication).

Ic was felt by the District that though the splice failure would in no way offset the electrically de-energized " Fail Safe" operation of the solenoid valves, a potential failure existed in the LOCA qualified pressurizer pressure, steam generator pressure and high pressure safety injection flow tranmitters, which =ust be functional in a post-LOCA environment.

Even though in the actual installation the splice is in a conduit fitting, it was felt that in the absence of test data, the splices should be reported.

A review of the test data indicates that the failure was a result of the steam and moisture environment attack on the splice.

The District feels that the best method to insure operability of the splice is to exclude the LOCA at=osphere from the splice.

To accomplish this the splice will be covered with a LOCA qualified Dow Corning RTV adhevise/

sealant.

The sealant will withstand steam (to 200 C) moisture, chemical spray, and has withstood a 100,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> 200 C aging test.

In addition it maintains all properties with a radiation dose of 2.5 x 10 R, which 7

meets LOCA qualification criteria.

Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285 LER No. 80-006The District feels that this splicing system - American Pamcor heat shrink tubing, RTV 2145 clear and the conduit fitting will insure operability.

In LER No.80-006 communication on 4/5/80, the heat shrink tubing was mistakenly identified as Penntube, the error was identified and communicated to the NRC Dan Mcdonald by R. F. Mehaffey on April 18, 1980.

Under this system, electrical reliability is provided by the heat shrink tubing, LOCA protection is provided by RIV and the conduit fitting prevents any direct Lnpingement.

It should be noted that in earlier review, the Franklin Institute report was not known by the District to exist.

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Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 Docket No. 05000285 LER No.80-006 i

i i

Attachment No. 2 Failure Data 4

1 This is the.first report of a potential splice failure at the Fort l

Calhoun Station.

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