05000354/LER-2017-001

LER-2017-001, 1 OF 3

Hope Creek Generating Station
Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
3542017001R00 - NRC Website

LER 17-001-00 for Hope Creek, Unit 1 Regarding Secondary Containment Door Not Latched in Closed Position

ML17188A314
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	07/07/2017
From:	Casulli E T Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N17-0112 LER 17-001-00
Download: ML17188A314 (5)

Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4) Reactor Building - EIIS Identifier {NG}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Event Date: May 8, 2017 Discovery Date: May 10, 2017

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Hope Creek was in Operational Condition 1 at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

During a walk down of the Reactor Building at Hope Creek on May 10, 2017, at approximately 10:00, door 4302 was found to be closed but the hand wheel not rotated to engage the latches. The door was being held in the closed position by the negative pressure in the Reactor Building. This condition was reported immediately to the control room, and the door handle was repositioned to engage the latches. The door position is indicated in the control room, and the door was verified to indicate closed at the time it was found to be not latched.

Door 4302 is a secondary containment boundary door, and is a single door arrangement. Hope Creek Technical Specifications require that for single door arrangements, the door remain closed except for routine entry and exit.

Technical Specifications require that the Secondary Containment Integrity be re-established within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or the reactor be in Hot Shutdown within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

A review of the door alarm history for door 4302 indicates that the door was last opened on May 8, 2017 at 1323. The door opening indication lasted approximately one minute, which corresponds to a routine entry or exit, as permitted by the Technical Specifications. There was no indication of the door being left open for an extended period of time and there were no door openings indicated after this transit until the time that the door was re-latched in the closed position on May 10, 2017. During the transit on May 8, 2017, the Reactor Building differential pressure lowered to approximately 0.16 inches of vacuum water gauge and quickly recovered to its normal control point of approximately 0.48 inches of vacuum water gauge, also indicating that the door remained closed following the transit.

Based on the review of door alarm history, the door was not latched for a period exceeding the Technical Specification allowable time period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, and therefore this represents a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause is a failure to properly use human performance tools such as self-check or a peer check to ensure the proper configuration of the door is maintained. Proper use of human performance tools when closing the door and engaging the latches would have identified that the latches on the door were not made up.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The Secondary Containment is designed to minimize any ground level release of radioactive material which may result from an accident. In the as found condition, the secondary containment door was in the closed position, supporting the function of the secondary containment.

However, in reviewing the postulated design basis accidents, the door could not be assured to remain closed under all accident conditions during the time when it was unlatched. Based on this, the secondary containment is considered to Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (r-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202. (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

Hope Creek Generating Station 05000-354 NUMBER J NO.

have been inoperable from the time of the last transit, May 8, 2017 at 1323, until the discovery and engagement of the door latches on May 10, 2017 at approximately 1000.

The secondary containment functions to control the release of radioactive materials by ensuring that any releases from the reactor building are elevated and monitored; therefore the condition could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function to control the release of radioactive materials in the event that the door were to open in response to accident conditions. The conditions under which the door could open were determined to be a seismic event, and a design basis LOCA coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP).

Any condition in which the door were to open, including accident conditions, would result in a control room alarm.

Control room alarm response procedures direct investigation and subsequent closure of the door, restoring the secondary containment function.

SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

This condition is a safety system functional failure as defined in NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

PREVIOUS EVENTS

A review of events for the past three years at Hope Creek was performed to determine if similar events had occurred.

No events were identified that involved secondary containment being breached due to mis--positioned doors or hatches.

Extent of condition was performed to determine if there are other Reactor Building secondary containment doors that could inadvertently be left unsecured such as door 4302. All other secondary containment doors have interlocks with a second door that prevent both from being open at the same time. This door is stand alone in this design.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The individuals that did not properly engage the door latches following transit were identified based on reactor building security access records. The individuals' behaviors were addressed in accordance with the station performance management process.

The station operations department has established additional administrative controls for passage through door 4302 to ensure that door latches are engaged following each transit.

COMMITMENTS

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this LER.